

5. In addition, it must remain possible to effect examinations and on-site inspections on challenge in the event of particular incidents. Such a procedure would not, however, be sufficient on its own for reliably verifying compliance with the convention, especially with regard to the obligation to destroy chemical weapons stocks and production plants and not to manufacture chemical weapons.

6. This paper is based on elements of previous papers presented to the Committee on Disarmament on the subject of a chemical weapons convention which met with a large measure of agreement and have been summarized in CD/220 as a result of the last session. It proceeds on the assumption that it is not practicable to subject to regular inspections all military and non-military plants for the manufacture, stockpiling and destruction of chemical weapons and agents covered by a convention. With regard to regular checks, the paper therefore concentrates on a procedure for inspecting plants suited for the manufacture of supertoxic chemical agents. The advantage of this type of regular procedure is that it can take place in a business-like atmosphere. The paper is based on the concepts outlined in CD/37, which have at the same time been developed further by subjecting binary chemical weapons to the rules. In part B below, the essential principles which a convention must contain are set out.

B. Essential principles of verification

(i)

1. Purpose of verification and obligations of the Contracting Parties

The purpose of verification is to ensure confidence in the observance of a convention and safeguard the security interests of the Contracting States. To this end, the Contracting Parties commit themselves, by treaty, to national statutory measures precluding a violation of the convention and to agreed international measures. The latter consist of regular checks on a precisely defined scale and of checks on special grounds (suspicion of the convention being violated). The Committee is responsible for carrying out the international verification measures. The Contracting Parties undertake to submit to the committee, within a specified brief period after the entry into force of the convention or, if it is ratified at a later date, when depositing their instrument of ratification, their declaration together with the data needed for regular checks and also to assist the committee by word and deed.

2. Explanations

In view of the different political, economic and technological conditions in the individual Contracting States, the type and scope of the national measures for verifying observance of the convention are subject to the authority and procedures of each individual State. For the purpose of evaluating statistical data, the committee will therefore recommend standardized methods and procedures and reach agreement on them with the Contracting Parties. Of central importance for verification are the regular checks described in section (ii) below. For the purpose of the special checks it is necessary from the point of view of the joint interest of completely dispelling any suspicions to use a method which may deviate from and even exceed the scope and procedure defined in section (ii) below.