

on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 385 and 435. Difficulties with the proposed implementation of the settlement, accepted by all parties in 1978, led to intensive negotiations in New York in March, and the nature of the proposal itself was altered significantly during the summer by the suggestion of a demilitarized zone along Namibia's northern border. Continuing hesitations prompted a further round of talks in Geneva in November, at which some progress was made in facilitating implementation of the settlement. At year's end, however, the basic commitment of the parties to proceed was still in abeyance, pending the outcome of the transition to independence in neighbouring Rhodesia. Questions remained concerning the timing of a ceasefire and UN-supervised elections in Namibia, and the role and composition of a new UN peacekeeping operation there.

The 1979 General Assembly session approved seven resolutions with regard to Namibia, which in general called for greater UN activity under the direction of the Council for Namibia and emphasized increased co-operation with the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). Canada and other members of the "Western Five" abstained as a matter of principle on the five resolutions dealing with the substance of the settlement effort, on the ground that they did not wish to take a substantive position while their own initiative for a negotiated settlement was at a sensitive juncture. The two other resolutions concerning the UN Fund for Namibia and a nationhood program for the territory were adopted by consensus.

The Commonwealth-sponsored negotiations between Britain and three Rhodesian leaders, for bringing Rhodesia to independence with majority rule, reached a successful conclusion in December. Reaction at the United Nations was prompt but uneven. The General Assembly adopted an omnibus resolution which Canada was unfortunately obliged to vote against, after having abstained on the corresponding resolution in 1978 and supported a consensus in the three previous years. The resolution was unacceptable to Canada because it did not adequately reflect the agreement just achieved, and indeed could have adversely affected its successful implementation by prematurely raising delicate issues such as sanctions. The resolution also recognized one party to the agreement, the Patriotic Front, as the "sole legitimate and authentic representative of the people" and endorsed the latter's "armed struggle". A far more constructive step was taken by the Security Council a few days later, when it decided to end economic sanctions imposed against Rhodesia in 1966 and 1968, thus helping launch the settlement in the atmosphere of hope and co-operation necessary to its fulfilment.

The rising African frustration with South Africa's continued policies of *apartheid* is evident in the increasing number and severity of UN resolutions on this subject, which call in general for greater efforts to combat *apartheid* and for an end to almost all forms of international contact

with South Africa. The 1979 General Assembly session adopted 18 such resolutions; Canada supported ten of these while abstaining on four and voting against four others. Canada considers *apartheid* an affront to mankind in its denial of fundamental human rights to the black majority of South Africa, and is thus prepared to support effective action designed to end it, but not some of the more polemical and extreme proposals. Canada voted against resolutions that urged termination of economic and other relations with South Africa, that linked Israel with South Africa (or Zionism with racism), and that endorsed armed struggle as a legitimate means of opposing *apartheid*. Abstentions were entered on resolutions where the above issues were implicit, where two radical liberation movements were designated the sole authentic representatives of the South African people, and where *apartheid* was judged to be a threat to international peace and security (a prerogative of the Security Council alone). Finally, Canada has maintained its support for South Africa's continued membership in the UN system, in the belief that increasing the isolation of South Africa from the world community reduces the effectiveness of the latter in promoting change in the former.

### Middle East

The tone of the General Assembly debate on the Middle East, as in previous years, contributed little to the prospects for peace in that region. Opposition to the Camp David process, including the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, was led by Arab states, usually with wide support from other Third World countries, and was a feature of a number of resolutions. Partly for this reason, Canada voted against ten of the 26 resolutions related to the Middle East, while supporting six and abstaining on seven. Three were adopted by consensus.

Canada has consistently supported the peace process begun with the Camp David Accords as an important first step towards a just and comprehensive settlement in the Middle East on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). In this spirit, Canada welcomed the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

Although Canada was no longer a member of the Security Council, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Flora MacDonald, spoke before the Council to condemn the taking of hostages at the American Embassy in Tehran as a fundamental violation of international law.

### Cyprus

Canada's principal contribution towards peace in Cyprus continued to be the maintenance of Canadian soldiers in the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). In the General Assembly debate, Canada stressed that the parties concerned in Cyprus must exert greater will and determination in the search for an acceptable solution to the island's problems if troop contributors are to maintain faith in the