

ly, creating a verification organization within an existing organization would likely mean collisions with existing bureaucracies and old ethics.

The afternoon discussion touched on several of the day's presentations. In response to questions, Mr. Deibert clarified several misconceptions having to do with how the proposed UNCIAD would operate. In particular, it was important to remember that UNCIAD would operate largely as a clearing house for this data. No one was proposing that the agency own and operate its own satellite resources. This was a much more modest undertaking intended to facilitate the general availability of satellite imagery, whether from commercial satellites or, possibly, more sophisticated sources. Many questions had yet to be resolved, including what the eventual membership might be and how UNCIAD would be related to the UN. One participant wondered if UNCIAD might supplement satellite-derived data with images from aerial resources. Another wondered whether UNCIAD might endeavour to collect information to combat piracy, crime, or environmental abuse. There was some reluctance to see a UNCIAD-type organization attempt too much and spread itself too thin.

With respect to the nature of confidence building, one participant made the good point that there must be some reason to sit down and begin negotiations in the first place. In the case of North Korea, what would drive it to begin serious confidence building negotiations (as opposed to simply going through the motions)? The reasons for undertaking a negotiation might not be compelling or enduring, as was the case with the Soviet Union prior to the CSCE. Nevertheless, there had to be some reason. Another participant observed that the literature on the pre-negotiation period might be helpful in understanding how "paradigm shifts" in security thinking occur, shifting participants' thinking in profound and unexpected ways. That literature might also suggest ways of enticing North Korean participation in the expectation that, down the road, significant change might become possible.

The discussion pursued this issue of how to engage North Korea in some form of negotiation. The consensus appeared to be that until the Kim regime came to an end, there was little prospect for constructive engagement. With the emergence of a new government in the North, more might be possible although this obviously remained an open question. It seemed both reasonable and constructive to make a variety of efforts to involve North Korean officials at various levels in discussions and informal contacts that would at least create a common ground and shared concepts for future interaction. It was also important, most participants felt, to begin training verification specialists now for the eventual task of monitoring a future security management regime on the peninsula.

A number of participants felt that it was very important to involve both policy makers and academics in the exploration of new security management options and approaches for Korea. Each could bring something useful to the table and would benefit from the interaction. There was less