

However as Rwanda so graphically showed, **early warning intelligence⁸ is not the problem.** "Certainly the specifics of the Rwandan crisis were unique and more horrific than might have been anticipated. However, there is clear proof that many parts of the international community, both NGO and UN were fully aware of the incipient crisis in Rwanda."⁹ **The failure continues to be what is done with early warnings.**

There are two uses for early warning, one consists of energising political decision makers to take decisions, the second consists of planning for an emergency. The first endeavour is undoubtedly the most difficult. The political disincentive to act upon early warnings permeates all levels of the UN. Most certainly the Secretary-General and his staff must consciously decide what warnings they can safely or effectively respond to.

The second use of early warning, planning for an emergency through contingency planning, can be and to a degree should be separated from the political energising objective. In this way the planners can be provided with sufficient space to get on with the requisite planning to enable effective and efficient response if the worst happens. This contingency planning will be dealt within Chapter 3.

Quite apart from early warning procedures, operational information sharing within the UN Secretariat and the UN system at large has proven to be an impediment to rapid reaction. Similarly, information sharing between UN HQ and field operations has been less than efficient. This appears to reflect the different nature between early warning and information sharing particularly in fast moving field situations. Early warning allows for a relatively more methodical gathering and sharing of information. Field operations are fraught with crisis management and confused lines of communications. There is some traditional UN hoarding of information, but much of the failure to communicate is the lack of mechanisms and standard procedures on how to share information.

DPKO has been moving to address some of the gaps, quite specifically through the creation of the Situation Centre. The Situation Centre provides a 24 hour nerve centre service, and is fostering discussion on possible mechanisms for effectively disseminating incoming information. With regards to preparing for rapid reaction, the recently created Conceptual Planning Unit is starting to identify its information and source requirements so that it can carry out contingency planning (see Chapter 3 below). The preparation of comprehensive operational plans requires a degree of country information and intelligence that may not yet exist within the UN system. It is problematic as to whether other national sources, e.g., US, France, UK, etc., can be tapped to provide such information. Or, should DPKO or another part of the UN develop its own sources of information particularly as it applies to the planning of peace-keeping or peace-enforcement missions?

In earlier peace-keeping missions the Force Commander (FC) reported directly to the SG. The FC now formally reports to one of the Regional Divisions in the Office of Operations. It was ventured that this would lessen the ability of the FC to pass back important military and political intelligence to key decision makers. In fact, the reverse may be true for in the past the SG's office was accused of being a choke

⁸ There was sentiment expressed as to problems in military early warning, although it is not clear how easily one can disaggregate military early warning from other early warning and whether there are substantial gaps in such intelligence. As discussed above, what is lacking is often military intelligence for effective mission planning as opposed to early warning.

⁹ p.4, LaRose-Edwards, P, *The Rwandan Crisis of April 1994: The Lessons Learned*, Department of Foreign Affairs (IDC), Ottawa Nov. 1994, pp.77.