



Notwithstanding the progress we have achieved, it is clear to my government that, while the end is in sight, we are not quite there yet. As Soviet Deputy Minister Petrovsky told this body on February 18, 'serious, major issues are still outstanding.' Some of us, conscious of the enormous strides taken and impatient to end the race, have suggested that these problems can be speedily resolved. I respectfully suggest that such an expectation, implicitly if not explicitly, belies the importance and difficulty of the remaining issues. As our Japanese colleague suggested on February 16, the danger of the marathon runner deciding to make a last desperate spurt towards his goal is that he risks running out of breath or stumbling into pitfalls. While the moment to begin our final sprint is not yet here, this is not to say that we cannot increase the measured pace Ambassador Yamada refers to — we can and we must; but we should make haste carefully.

With respect to the major issues referred to by Soviet Deputy Minister Petrovsky, it is evident that several of them turn on the central issue of effective verification.

First and foremost among the outstanding verification issues is the question of the non-production of chemical weapons — the Article VI issues. These involve some of the most complex and difficult decisions of the entire treaty negotiation process. Assuming that we have an effective regime developed for destroying existing CW stocks and CW production facilities (i.e., for Articles III through V), how can we achieve an optimally reliable verification regime for non-production, with minimal intrusion or interruption in the legitimate commercial activities of our chemical industries?

In the view of the Canadian Government, the problems raised here should not be insuperable. Several valuable and illuminating suggestions for filling gaps and resolving issues, like that most recently submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany on *ad hoc* checks, have been advanced and warrant our careful consideration. Moreover, as suggested at the Pugwash Conference last

month, equipment and procedures that would go a considerable way to realizing our goals exist already or could be designed and developed within a reasonable time. It is encouraging to note that the industry itself is now actively engaged with our problems and positively inclined to helping us solve them.

A second major area of direct relevance to verification is Article VIII and our efforts to develop an organizational structure to ensure the effective and efficient implementation of the Convention, as well as its timely adaptation in the light of experience and new technological and scientific developments. It is the International Inspectorate, with its verification tasks, which will carry the greatest responsibility for ensuring that the Convention is, and is seen to be, effectively implemented. With this in mind, my government intends to submit in the near future working papers dealing with the personnel and other resource requirements of the International Inspectorate.

Effectiveness of verification is also a relevant consideration for a third major area of concern, the Challenge Inspection provisions of Article IX. We seem agreed that a challenge inspection is to be a rare event; a last resort when all other avenues are exhausted. This underlines the importance of putting in place as complete and as comprehensive *routine* inspection procedures as possible. Insofar as the conduct of a challenge inspection itself is concerned, I suggest that the most essential requirements are that the inspectors have the fullest access and information possible that they need, and the indisputable technical competence, to allow them to conduct a thorough inspection and issue a definitive report. If this requirement can be met, then many of the concerns and issues currently preoccupying us in terms of procedures for handling inspection reports might well diminish or disappear.

A further major issue related to these considerations is the question of exchanges of data prior to the coming into force of the Convention. Clearly, some such exchanges will be essential,

not only as confidence-building steps, but to assist in making realistic assessments of the extent of verification required and the size of the machinery needed to implement it. The information already provided by some states has been useful in this regard. In particular, we welcome the attention that both the USA and the USSR have given to this issue. Here, I might note our interest in the proposals submitted by Deputy Minister Petrovsky on February 18; they contain some useful suggestions which we hope will be further clarified and built upon in the weeks to come.

Mr. President, the negotiation of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable global ban on chemical weapons would be a pioneering achievement in the area of multilateral arms control. This would be the first time the international community has negotiated a multilateral agreement, banning an entire class of weaponry, incorporating detailed and elaborate verification provisions touching extensively on activities in civilian industry, and involving the establishment from scratch of a new treaty-administering authority to oversee its implementation in perpetuity. This, we all agree, poses formidable challenges. Our shared sense of urgency in this work can only be strengthened by continued reports, verified by the UN Secretary-General, of repeated chemical weapons use and by disturbing reports of the proliferation of chemical weapons capabilities. Canada was therefore gratified to note that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in their Joint Summit Statement on December 10, 1987, 'reaffirmed the need for intensified negotiations towards conclusion of a truly global and verifiable convention.'

I turn now to Item I on our agenda, Nuclear Test Ban. A comprehensive test ban (CTB) remains a fundamental Canadian policy objective. It is of special interest to participants in this forum that the major nuclear powers have also launched a process of negotiations relating to nuclear tests. The planned exchange of on-site observations of nuclear tests on their respective territories augurs well and will, we hope, pave the way for the earliest ratification,