

its application to Europe, I am troubled by a broader implication. Non-nuclear weapons are in an advanced state of technology, and are widely marketed. Sea-skimming missiles, laser-guided bombs and fragmentation weapons are available for distribution. Is it the purpose of nuclear arms control to make the world safe for conventional warfare?

Surely a basic term is missing in this equation: it is the encouragement of an equilibrium of conventional arms and forces, balanced at lower rather than higher levels. An agreed framework of conventional deterrence against armed aggression — but significantly reducing any dangerous concentration of forces....

Some of the answers lie in the ragged course of East-West relations over the past 15 years. Those relations have an innate tendency to defy management and control. They are animated by competing philosophies and civilizations, and armed with weaponry that is global in scope....

As Canadians, we know where we stand. We have a distinguished record of accomplishment in working for international peace and security....

I don't believe we had any illusions about the short-lived and much-maligned period of *détente*. I certainly have no embarrassment about my own part in that process, bred in a conjuncture of geopolitics, economic aspirations, and collective leadership on both sides.

But the process too soon became part of the problem....

*Détente* rapidly showed signs of a process being drained of its substance. Core issues were held hostage by one side or the other — human rights, economic co-operation, hegemony in key spheres of influence. *Détente* became both divisible, and reversible.

And yet, I am not ready to call *détente* a failure. There were clear benefits of stability and co-operation. Its long-term impact, for example on Soviet elites, cannot yet be judged. Moreover it did coincide with, or provoke, an important impulse in the early Seventies which seems to have been lost without trace. It is the impulse toward political dialogue, toward regular consultation at the most senior levels of the East-West system....

With the loss of that impulse, and in the absence of high politics in the East-West relationship, it is not surprising that any shred of trust or confidence in the intentions of the other side appears to have vanished as well. Also missing, and

On the occasion of his speech in Guelph, Prime Minister Trudeau announced his intention to visit leaders in Belgium, France, Italy, West Germany and the Netherlands in order to strengthen the East-West dialogue. Of this initiative, *The Gazette* of Montreal commented:

"One cannot disregard the rightness or timeliness of his move. The Soviets, expecting no advantage in appearing conciliatory, may launch more adventures such as Afghanistan and use more Grenadas in response. It is this deterioration Mr. Trudeau wants to stop. It appears he does not see himself as an orchestra leader in a peace concert, though his publicists will surely cast him in this role. He sees himself as one of many Western leaders who want to establish an effective channel of communication between Moscow and Washington, one on which superpowers will talk more quietly than on abusive megaphones they now use."

this troubles me deeply, is much trace of political craft and creativity directed at ameliorating the intentions of the other side. There is disturbing complacency, a readiness to adapt to the worse rather than to exert our influence for the better. We are, in short, de-politicizing the most important political relationship we have.

The responsibility for this lies partly, but by no means exclusively, with both superpowers. The United States and the Soviet Union outstrip the rest of us in their global reach, their armaments, and their leadership responsibilities....

I believe that military strategy must, above all, serve a comprehensive set of political objectives and controls, which dominate and give purpose to modern weapons and to military doctrine. Our central purpose must be to create a stable environment of increased security for both East and West. We must aim at suppressing those nearly instinctive fears, frustrations, or ambitions which have so often been the reason for resorting to the use of force....

This was, in a limited sense, the philosophy which underpinned the NATO response to the Soviet build-up of SS-20 missiles in Europe. We had to ask ourselves what purpose of political intimidation could be served by that build-up.

That is why we decided to respond with a two-track approach — deployment and negotiations. This approach has given the Soviet Union both the clear incentive to reach agreement, and the table at which to do so. I and my fellow NATO heads of government remain firmly committed to that two-track decision.

The tragic shooting down of the Korean airliner raises further questions about military dominance on the Soviet side. Is the Soviet military system edging beyond the reach of the political authorities? Are we contributing to such a trend by the absence of regular contact with the Soviet leadership?

These considerations suggest that our two-track decision may also require, as the time for deployment comes closer, a "third rail" of high-level political energy to speed the course of agreement — a third rail through which might run the current of our broader political purposes, including our determination not to be intimidated.

The risk of accident or miscalculation is too great for us not to begin to repair the lines of communication with our adversaries. The level of tension is too high for us not to revive a more constructive approach to the containment of crises. The degree of mutual mistrust is too intense for us not to try to rebuild confidence through active political contact and consultation....

What is missing is a strategy of confidence-building measures of a political nature:

- steps that reduce tensions caused by uncertainty about objectives, or caused by fear of the consequences of failure;
- steps that mitigate hostility and promote a modicum of mutual respect;
- steps that build an authentic confidence in man's ability to survive on this planet.

In short, we must take positive steps in order to reverse the dangerously downward trend-line in East-West relations.

I shall be exploring such steps with our allies, with other leaders, and with groups such as yours. We must work in a balanced and rational fashion, with a degree of trust, a degree of belief in the good sense of mankind, and with a strong recognition that the task is urgent. The negotiations on theatre nuclear forces in Europe, and on strategic forces, are taking place between the superpowers. Canada is not at the table, and we have no wish to insert ourselves into this vital and delicate process. It is my

(Continued on P. 8)