

feel the pain of childbirth, but their knowledge of that pain affects their whole view of women and their willingness to work for them. Nobody can prove the fact in regard to all pain; but we think many will dimly see that all visible pain, besides developing sympathy, helps to nourish a condition of mind which of itself kills or diminishes the tendency to ease, which, if indulged, would be fatal to the utility of man in the great scheme of the universe. He must have a value somehow, little as it may be—and to predicate littleness of an immortal being is pretty much nonsense—and if he lived, as he would live in a painless world, like a stronger Hawaiian Islander, that value would be reduced to zero, for it must lie ultimately in his energy, a quality as essential to moral grandeur as to the attainment of concrete or intellectual results. That some forms of pain seem useless, or even injurious to enterprise—e.g., seasickness—is little to the matter, if to the totality of pain in the world is due an appreciable impulse to exert ourselves. And we repeat that it may be. A painless world is hardly conceivable, because it would be a world without any irresistible and permanent impulse towards doing anything; but so far as we can conceive of it, it would be of necessity a world given up to reflection by the few, and to enjoyment by the many, and we know what sort of world that would rapidly become,—a Rome without the circus, which last would become savourless without any agony to see. A painless world would be a world of worthless men and women.

But we may be told, if this suggestion has anything in it, the necessary deduction is that pain is a good, and should, even if preventable, be permitted to continue. Nay, the true deduction is precisely the contrary. If it is the object of pain to stimulate human energy, there is no form of energy which it stimulates so much, or which is so valuable, as the sustained energy necessary to the prevention of pain. Three-fourths of mankind, if we include the growers and distributors of food—and hunger is the universal pain—are devoting themselves to that task already, and it is neither done nor will be done. The inventor of anaesthetics did not diminish the energy of mankind, but increased it by restoring health for the world's work, which, if our suggestion is valid, is ordered and compelled by the fear of pain. The philanthropist does no mischief, except when he diminishes the energy of those he helps, and that is not often, the great impelling forces driven by pain being wholly beyond his reach. He can do something, but the fear of hunger is fortunately produced by laws over which he has no control; and in diminishing other pain, he is using, and using well, the very habit of exertion which pain, as we are to-day contending, was intended to produce.—*The Spectator*.

## OCTOBER.

A FITFUL wind about the eaves,  
That sways the creaking door;  
The shadows of the falling leaves  
Flit past me on the floor.

The autumn skies are clear above,  
But silent is their song;  
Oh, spirit of the changeless love  
Keep back my autumn song!

In vain with gold the forest weaves  
Its sylvan greenness o'er;  
The shadows of the falling leaves  
Flit past me on the floor.

It means the world is growing old,  
It means no birds to sing:  
Oh, not for all the autumn's gold  
Would I forego my spring!

—*Macmillan's Magazine*.

## THE PHILOSOPHY OF THEISM.\*

MANY good people who are by no means to be classed among the uneducated have the strongest prejudice against the application of science or philosophy to the subject of religion. It is, they think, an undue elevation of reason into the sphere of revelation, which may result in very serious consequences to human beings and to the Christian faith. It may be well to set down in a very few words what we believe to be the substratum of truth in these prejudices, and where we think they represent grave error.

If any one shall assign such a place to reason as to imply that revelation is unnecessary, we believe that he is not only denying what we believe to be a teaching come from God, but he is doing wrong to reason and contradicting experience. It is a simple matter of fact that "the world by wisdom knew not God," and people who, like Mr. Francis Newman, talk disdainfully of a "Book-revelation" will have to explain how it is that Christ, or the New Testament which is the record of His life and teaching, has changed the human conception of the Deity, and has given us an idea of God which commends itself as true to the intelligence and conscience, and which we feel that we can never part with.

On the other hand, although reason could not discover the contents of revelation, yet reason must receive the truth revealed; for truth speaks to the reason, and it is only by the possession of reason that we are capable of receiving revealed or any kind of truth. And indeed the

functions of reason in relation to revelation are manifold. It must investigate its credentials, it must examine its contents, and it must discover their bearing upon belief and action. So far probably there will be little difference of opinion among people who care to weigh the meaning of the words here employed.

But many who will allow, perhaps reluctantly, that reason after all has something to do with religion will shrink from the application of science and philosophy to supernatural subjects. Partly they know that some men of science and philosophers have been unorthodox; partly they remember some doubtful words of S. Paul on these subjects. But they forget that the abuse does not destroy the legitimate use. They might as well quote what the Apostle says about knowledge puffing up, and thence infer that all knowledge was mischievous and therefore to be avoided.

Few will go to this length nowadays. Knowledge, at any rate of a practical kind, is what every one is now in search of. And what is science? Science is merely systematic knowledge, and assuredly the more our knowledge is brought into method and system, the more perfect and trustworthy it is. Surely the more clearly it is seen that one opinion which we hold does not contradict another of our opinions, the more shall we be inclined to believe that our opinions are true. Are there any intelligent religious people who deny the use and value of theology? If there are they must be very thoughtless, or they must be speaking without thinking. But theology is the science of religion and of God.

Each age demands the application of science or philosophy to religion in such a way as to meet the doubts and questionings which are then current. At one time it is Judaism which must be satisfied that its prophecies are fulfilled. At another time it is Paganism that must have its objections to the contents of the gospel rebutted. In the last century Butler and Paley met the attacks of the Deists—negatively, by showing that the objections raised against revelation were equally valid against the Divine government of the world; positively, by showing that Christianity had sufficient historical grounds to rest upon.

The attitude of unbelief has changed. It is not Judaism or Paganism or Deism that we have now to deal with: it is sheer Materialism and Atheism. And it must be dealt with, if men are to be freed from the most cruel and degrading belief or unbelief which has ever gained possession of the human mind. It is often said that Atheism is moral unbelief, and not intellectual; that men *will not* believe in a personal God, because they do not like to believe in one. This was truer in former days than it is now. No doubt it is still true to some extent. Among those—many we fear—who say "there is no God," there are doubtless a good many who deny that the voice within them which speaks for righteousness is the voice of God, simply because they have given no heed to that voice, and are unwilling to think they must give account to the speaker. But there are certainly a good many who, if not Atheists, are practically the same thing, Agnostics, on scientific grounds.

This is a fact which cannot surprise us, and need not greatly distress us. Our forefathers were so much in the habit of accounting for many of the phenomena of nature and of history by the theory of an arbitrary will, that we cannot wonder that the influence of will should now be denied everywhere in history. In so many cases the reign of law has been so clearly established in the place formerly assigned to what we may almost call the action of caprice, that we must not wonder if men say, Law is everywhere, and then most illogically infer that because law is there therefore mind is not!

It is here that modern Apologetics is doing good service for the foundations of the faith. Some of the most important works on this subject are now dealing formally and directly with Materialism. We may mention the works of Professors Flint and Harris, and this work of Professor Bowne which is now before us. This is a thoroughly sound and effective argument for the existence and personality of God, setting forth the proofs in a manner which, if not absolutely new, yet represents the philosophical development of the last few years. Dr. Bowne's is neither the ontological nor the cosmological argument, neither the physico-theological (teleological) nor yet the moral, and yet it may be said to savour of all the four. Indeed in one place the author seems to think he is giving us the teleological argument, the argument from design; but it is in reality quite distinct from that which was so brilliantly elaborated by Paley. When we say that it is almost identical with that which now goes by the name of Neo-Kantian, which some call Neo-Hegelian, and that it is almost exactly the same as that which is set forth in the late Professor Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, many of our readers will understand what we mean. In short, it is the very reverse of the absurdity just referred to—that law excludes mind. This argument insists and proves that law is of necessity the revelation of mind. To those who are not familiar with this line of thought we confidently recommend Professor Bowne's volume. The leading topics discussed are: (1) "The Unity of the World-Ground," (2) "The World-Ground as Intelligent," (3) "The World-Ground as Personal," (4) "The Metaphysical Attributes of the World-Ground," (5) "God and the World," (6) "The World-Ground as Ethical," (7) "Theism and Life."

We should like to give a summary of the argument by which the world-ground is demonstrated to be intelligible and personal; but we reserve this for an account of the other works which we have mentioned.

## UNION.

SCORN not the aid one loyal mind can bring;  
A noble growth expands by small degrees;  
Not all at once leaves clothe the wintry trees;  
But each burst bud helps on the greening Spring.

—*W. Wilsey Martin*.

\* *Philosophy of Theism*. By Professor Borden P. Bowne. New York: Harper and Brothers.