

## CORRESPONDENCE.

Letters should be brief, and written on one side of the paper only. Those intended for insertion should be addressed to the Editor, 162 St. James Street, Montreal; those on matters of business to the Manager, at the same address.

## "THE RELIGION OF FREE TRADE."

To the Editor of the CANADIAN SPECTATOR:

SIR,—Your correspondent "W. R. L." has caught the fundamental idea rightly; but like the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher and "Argus" he argues wrongly from it.

"God is love." Therefore God is life; for love is life. But who is, in his primary, love, will, or life, is not a puppet. He is free will, free life—and this is his, is *him* in fact. He can limit will or life within the boundaries of self, or he can let it find fuller expanse towards his neighbour, and still further extension toward God. So this love, which is life, becomes distinguishable by its state or condition into love of self, love of the neighbour, or love of God. Yet still it is love, will, life. Is this logical or is it not?

It should hardly be needful to combat "W. R. L.'s" corollary that because we are to love our neighbour as ourselves *therefore* (the italics are mine) the more we love ourselves the more we shall love our neighbour. It does not follow, except in so far as we carry out the principle involved of love to the neighbour *exactly equal* to love of self. The will to benefit self is directly contrary to the will to benefit our neighbour. The more we love self, the less we shall love our neighbour. If we do love self in any degree (and who, as yet, does not?) and strive to love our neighbour as much, we shall soon find that we are quite unable to draw any distinction between self and the neighbour; and the more we love self and still continue to keep pace with *that* love in love to the neighbour, the more we must lose all identity—lose self utterly—in love of others; till we reach the height of that other commandment, which explains this one, "as ye *would* that men should do unto you, do ye even so to them." The meaning of that commandment is plain on the surface—that the highest and best we could wish man to do to or for us, *that* we ought to do to and for them. We are not told to do to them *as they do to us*, but as we *would* that they should do to us. So we become God-like. So we grow in likeness to the divine humanity, till we can truly love and know Him who *is* God.

For such love—for such life—every faculty of man's being is especially and *only* fitted. It is the end or aim of our creation. But we *can* do otherwise if we *will*, and so dwarf and torture every power within and around us—yet still live a self-centred life. This is "eternal punishment"—eternal loss. The other is everlasting life—everlasting gain in others' good. Remember, we *can* if we *will*, God helping us. We *can't* if we *won't*. Eusebius.

## In re LETELLIER—RETROSPECTIVE.

To the Editor of the CANADIAN SPECTATOR:

SIR,—Viewed from the standpoint of Constitutionalism, however satisfactory it may be to political parties to have an ultimatum in the matter, the settlement reached in the Letellier question is decidedly unsatisfactory. It was to have been expected that by the result to be attained fresh light would have been shed upon the meaning of the charter of our Constitution, as set out in the British North America Act, and some advance made towards certainty in the application of its terms in the future. The parade of counsellors on both sides of the question that came off in Downing Street would naturally confirm expectation in this respect. However gratifying it may be to Sir John's mission that its view was sustained, a more barren result as adding to the growth of knowledge of our Constitution cannot be conceived. That the Colonial Secretary should have again conceded the principle, that Imperial interference in matters coming solely within the purview of the internal administration of the Dominion was not admissible, cannot be claimed as any addition to our knowledge of the Constitution under which we live, or an adequate issue to the efforts put forth by our political parties in the Letellier affair. And yet, apart from the political triumph of one party over another, the confirmation of the principle mentioned on the part of the Imperial authorities is all that the country has gained by the turmoil and expenditure of time and money into which it has been dropped. It does not take more than a cursory consideration of our Constitution and position as regards government relative to the Imperial authorities, to convince us that Imperial interference in this affair as a prime move was not for a moment to be anticipated. The Canadian Constitution consists of the supposed certainty of the B. N. A. Act, to which are to be added, in points where this Act is silent, the constitutional precedents and practice of the British Constitution. To the Colonial office we should with propriety turn for the interpretation, by the light of this supplementary portion of our Constitution, of any points which might come up for settlement, and upon which the B. N. A. Act was silent; further than this importunity to that office should not go. The B. N. A. Act, being to all intention, then, specific on the matter of dismissals of Lieutenant-Governors, there was plainly no warrant for the obtrusion of the matter on the Imperial authorities. For the interpretation of every Act of Parliament a proper tribunal must exist, and though the atmosphere in which the conduct of satraps of Provinces is adjudicated upon may

be more rarified than that in which judicial labours are generally engaged, still our Supreme Court is as fully competent and vested with authority to consider matters occurring in such an atmosphere, as it is to pronounce upon the constitutionality of any of the Acts passed by Provincial Legislatures. Whatever objections might be urged to this tribunal from its *personnel* consisting of appointees from the political parties of the country, whose soul may not have become altogether dead to party views of a matter of this kind, they would have no force as against our other Court of final resort,—the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The B. N. A. Act seems clear enough in providing for the dismissal of Lieut.-Governors by the *Governor-General for cause*, and although the view that thereby was meant the Governor-General in Council, in consequence of the latter being stated to be the appointing body for such officers, and from the fact that the B. N. A. Act provides that *the cause* of removal should be laid before both Houses of Parliament; yet, if it can be assumed that the framers of these provisions were actuated by prescient statesmanship enough to provide checks against the outrageous exercise of them, the literal interpretation of the terms of such provisions seems the most reasonable and most to commend itself to unprejudiced people who wish to see our Constitution a practicable, working reality, and not one subject to the arbitrary caprice of party. That party motives should have the check applied to them of the independent action of the Governor-General, free from the bidding of his Council, in cases relating to the removal of the officers mentioned, is not more reasonable than appears from the wholesome checks put upon any arbitrary action in those cases by the Governor-General from the knowledge that the *cause* or motives of such action must, by the terms of the B. N. A. Act, be presented to the representatives of the people, who would then be placed in a position to properly impugn if necessary the action of their Governor-General and obtain redress by appeal to the Colonial Office. If this view of the competence of the Governor-General, independently of Council, to decide questions of dismissals of Lieutenant-Governors be correct, the only reason in the Government's mission to England was for the purpose of persuading the Colonial Office to influence the Governor-General to yield to the advice of his Ministers and dismiss Letellier, the idea of the Colonial Office being invoked to interpret the B. N. A. Act and decide that *Governor-General* meant *Governor-General in Council* being preposterous and out of the question.

No Lieut.-Governor would be bound by the interpretation put upon the B. N. A. Act from such a quarter, nor is Mr. Letellier bound any more by the manner in which his dismissal was conveyed to him. He is informed that the *Governor-General by an Order in Council* deposes him, whereas the B. N. A. Act states that the *Governor-General*, without the interference of Council, shall only depose Lieutenant-Governors. He has a right to have his *coup de grace* given him by the Governor-General independent, or to resist the dismissal and require, at all events, that a proper and competent tribunal should decide the matter for him. It is idle to argue that the greater includes the less, and that a dismissal by the Governor-General in Council includes the performance of the same act by the same exalted personage without Council. To allow this would be to negative the possession of any opinion or the capability of holding any opinion on the part of the Governor-General, differing from the dictates of his Council!

Furthermore, if Mr. Letellier should be moved by consideration for the Governor-General, and not wish to even run the risk of precipitating a rupture between the Governor-General and his Council on the one hand by his refusing to dismiss, or on the other hand possibly be the means of making him do violence to his convictions from the fear of such a rupture, and dismiss him under his own sign manual, another source of appeal is open to the Lieutenant-Governor should he feel himself sufficiently injured to avail himself of it. It cannot surely be sufficient that any *cause* whatever be assigned for such a proceeding without a sufficient justification be involved in the assignment! The Colonial Office did not undertake to intervene and decide between Sir Francis Hincks and his Chief Justice in Demerara, though no Act of Parliament indicated the method to be adopted; but the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was invoked for the purpose. From a party point of view it may be pardonable that the mission of the Dominion should consider that their duty in the premises was satisfactorily performed, and their journey justified by the issue of the affair being favourable in every respect to their views, while Mr. Joly may have been misled as to the view the Colonial Office would finally take of the affair, yet it is much to be regretted that the latter had not urged more strongly, if he did so at all, the immediate reference of the whole affair, by a special case stated, to the Judicial Committee. That he did not do so, however, cannot in any way prejudice the rights of Mr. Letellier to dispute, under the B. N. A. Act, both the manner of dismissal and the sufficiency of the cause assigned. The expense of submitting a case of this kind would have been half what political factions have spent of the public money by their missions, without in law or justice accomplishing any good by the expenditure, or contributing one iota to our knowledge of the Constitution under which we live. As Mr. Letellier appears to have meekly accepted the situation and not have stood by the 'order of his going,' the country must possess itself in patience for the advent of some less yielding Lieutenant-Governor to procure for it a conclusive decision as to who can dismiss Lieutenant-Governors, and the quality of the *cause* that must be assigned.—Yours, &c., Patriot.

Just as we go to press we are in receipt of a letter with reference to an item in our last number entitled "Queer things in the newspapers," which we are compelled to hold over until our next issue.