tough stance on Soviet espionage activities — for example, expulsion of the culprits with publicity — ever seriously has damaged our relations with Russia. Indeed, a case can be made that by redressing the balance the relationship would become healthier, less hypocritical and, in the long-term Canada's interests would be better served.

## **Espionage**

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During the debate in the last parliament on the bill to create the civilian Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), various aspects of the bill were criticized but few concrete suggestions for amendment were put forward. One example was the criticism that the bill did not offer a sufficiently precise definition of espionage and that this was a serious flaw in the legislation. Those making the criticism. however, did not offer a definition of their own, which is not surprising since it is difficult to do. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language describes espionage as; "the systematic use of spies by a government to discover the military and political secrets of other nations." Fine so far as it goes but it does not go nearly far enough. However, even if one could come up with a satisfactory, succinct definition it may not be wise to enshrine it in legislation. To do so might only serve to restrict the kind of counter measures that could be taken without affecting or diminishing the activities of those carrying out espionage activities. How espionage is defined depends upon whether one is on the giving or the receiving end. Canada is on the receiving end, and has been for over 45 years. Canada does not carry out espionage activities in other countries.

Thus, perforce, what others do determines the perception, and, if you wish, the definition of the activity. This fact, and not some theoretical notion of what constitutes espionage, has to govern the perception, and if need be, the definition of the word and the nature of the countermeasures employed. With something as dynamic and fast changing as espionage it cannot be otherwise.

It might be instructive to consider for a moment what might be entailed if Canada were to carry out espionage in other countries on the Russian model. The activities would be world-wide in their scope. In relative terms unlimited financial, human and other resources would be made available. The training facilities would be among the finest in the world. The technical laboratories and special facilities would be among the best obtainable. Virtually all Canadian diplomatic and consular missions would have a complement of highly trained intelligence officers. In addition, a good proporation of our nationals working within various international organizations, such as the United Nations and its specialized agencies, would be intelligence officers. Throughout the world a network of secret agents would be operating under carefully manufactured false identities, with their own secure, direct communications with Ottawa.

The classic view of espionage is the acquisition by clandestine means of secret information of a political, economic, scientific and military nature. However, there are a number of other activities, which, although they may not fit the classic view of espionage nevertheless have to be considered and countered. The never ending attempts by the KGB and others to compromise Canadians through black-

mail, entrapment and coercion comes to mind. Literally scores of such attempts have been reported in the past twenty-five years and it must be assumed there are some such attempts which go unreported and thus are unknown to the authorities. The victims have included officials, journalists, politicians, diplomats, cypher clerks, businessmen, academics, tourists and sportsmen — the KGB's tastes are eclectic. The unsavoury methods used are designed to take advantage of the human frailities of individuals they consider some day may be of use of them.

Other examples of activies by Soviet bloc agents in Canada which can be said to be encompassed by the term "espionage" are: harassment of ethnic groups for political and other purposes; the creation of agents of influence who, consciously or unconsciously serve some Soviet purpose; the collection (sometimes by quite legal means) of data intended eventually to be used for intelligence purposes — records of births and deaths, street maps and directories, telephone books and federal and provincial government regulations and forms; the provision of clandestine financial support for causes and political groups serving some interest of the Soviet Union and; the provision of idelogical and military instruction for groups and individuals whose avowed aim is the destruction of Canada's institutions and those of her allies. It might be added that it is not unlawful for Canadians and Landed Immigrants to receive such training abroad.

## Disinformation

Disinformation could be said to be subsumed by the world espionage. However, in recent years, disinformation has become so important it deserves special attention as a separate activity. In the Soviet Union responsibility for disinformation lies within the First Chief Directorate of the KGB which, generally speaking, conducts KGB operations abroad. Service "A" or Active Measures evolved in the early 1970's from Department "A" of the First Chief Directorate, then known at the Disinformation Department. Its officers are among the most gifted and creative members of the KGB, with extensive knowledge of the language, customes, cultures and changing life-styles of other countries.

Those serving in Active Measures are capable of producing, from the Department's own resources, skilled forgeries, fabrications and literature the origins of which can be cleverly disguised. However, the Department also can draw upon the extensive resources of "S" Directorate, which handles KGB secret agents operating throughout the world under false indentities — in other words what are known in the trade as "illegals." In support of their activities, "S" Directorate gathers extensive information about other countries. Applied to Canada this might include; passport application forms and regulations, citizenship and immigration forms and regulations, Unemployment Insurance forms and regulations, provincial motor vehicle registration and licensing forms and regulations and a great many other similar documents. Such collection efforts also extend to obtaining samples of the signatures and handwriting of Ministers and officials at the federal and provincial levels and of keeping these current.