

Deciding for ourselves

but was too engaged elsewhere to expound. And it was Brian Mulroney and Joe Clark, two very progressive conservatives and very direct descendants of the populist John Diefenbaker, who chose Tom Hockin from a multitude of all-too-conservative aspirants to help the government discover and articulate the national mood.

3. POLICYMAKERS' PARADIGMS

What then did these Prime Ministers and those who elected them believe? With rare exceptions it has been something far removed from a worldview based on the realist necessity of a close alignment with the United States. Indeed, during the past four decades these Prime Ministers took a willing country into periods of profound confrontation with the United States on at least two occasions (1962-63 and 1971-74) and through intervals of serious divergence on several others (1980-84, 1968-71, and 1965-68). During the postwar decades the intellectual foundation and resulting shape of Canadian foreign policy has been autonomously set on four major occasions: the "internationalist" revolution of 1947; the "anti-nuclear" revolution of 1963; the "globalist" revolution of 1970; and the embryonic "new internationalist" revolution of 1985. These four revolutions may represent, from a neo-realist perspective, the distinctive Canadian responses to US hegemony as the latter passed through four of its critical transitions. Yet the Canadian responses well reflect just how un-American and unrealist the Canadian view of the world has been.

The internationalist revolution, begun in 1943, was won on the evening of January 7, 1948, when Prime Minister King averted the resignation of his foreign minister Louis St. Laurent, by allowing Canada to fulfill its commitment to serve on the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. King saw the Commission and Canada's membership on it as a US plot to mobilize the UN and Canada in support of American neo-isolationist and anti-communist national security purposes. St. Laurent saw it as the fulfillment of a responsibility for active participation by a committed creator of the new United Nations. Both King and St. Laurent ultimately won. Canada took up its membership, but with a successful scheme for getting off, as soon as possible, a body that was, in fact, a classic example of what John Holmes called "Americanism masquerading as internationalism."

The anti-nuclear revolution of 1963 was the culmination of John Diefenbaker's efforts to separate Canada from the expansive national security system of an ascendant United States. Begun with his cancellation of the Avro Arrow in February 1959, and his distancing of Canada from American positions in the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, this revolution saw John Diefenbaker go down to electoral defeat in an attempt to maintain a nuclear-free Canada.

Trudeau's policy

It was left to Pierre Trudeau to complete this anti-nuclear revolution and the larger globalist revolution of which it was a part. Immediately upon entering office as Prime Minister in 1968, Trudeau announced a host of initiatives very divergent from the policies of the United States: the diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of

China; the reduction of Canadian force commitments in the central European theater of NATO; and the creation of the International Development Research Centre. He followed with the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of 1970, ventures in North-South relations, and a concluding peace initiative. Pierre Trudeau's foreign policy in total was largely directed at affirming the rights of individual citizens of the world against the prerogatives of the sovereign state, the collective rights of deprived communities against the rich, powerful and established, and the centrality of new international institutions and arrangements against the inherited privileges of older structures.

Mulroney and Clark

The most recent and still embryonic revolution in Canadian foreign policy is the new internationalism of Brian Mulroney and Joe Clark. This approach centers on an effort to reconstruct, renew and expand the network of international institutions at a time when the United States is directly assaulting the entire edifice. The most dramatic expression of this impulse came in the great foreign policy offensive in the autumn of 1985 when the government decided to open bilateral trade liberalization negotiations with the United States, to reject government-to-government participation in the United States' Strategic Defence Initiative research program, to declare full sovereignty over the waters of Canada's Arctic archipelago, to lead the Commonwealth against apartheid in South Africa, and to produce a head-of-governments forum for La Francophonie. The only realist decision in this program — the declaration of full sovereignty over the Arctic waters — flew in the face of important US national security interests. The freer trade decision, whatever its merits, lies largely outside of the domain of standard American realist and even neo-realist discourse. The SDI decision was premised on a limited role for the state and a large role for the private sector and reflected the very non-realist influence of domestic public opinion. And the South African, Commonwealth and La Francophonie decisions were about issues, institutions and ideas where both Americans and realists are largely absent.

4. POLITICAL CULTURE

Why have realist premises and practices been so absent from the central initiatives and ideological foundations of Canadian foreign policy during the post-World War Two decades? The answer lies in the essential irrelevance of realism as a description or explanation of Canada's place in the world. Indeed realists and Canadians represent for each other the ultimate irrationality. For the conceptual requirements of the theory are defied by the historic experience of the country. As one of the most territorially expansionist, richest, and most stable and secure countries in the modern international system, Canada is the realist's archetypical success story. Yet realists' views of how the world works offer no explanation of how this striking achievement came about. For Canada, using virtually none of the realist repertoire, managed to secure this success in the face of all the classic realist obstacles. These obstacles include an intense competition with a vastly more powerful rival, a geopolitical position smack between the ascendant states (the superpower rivals of the twentieth century), an