

(e) Reaffirmation of USA view that Ceasefire Agreement should be regarded as continuing in force (subject to the obvious inapplicability of prohibitions against introduction of troops and equipment), and that ultimate objective should be a resumption of full observance of the CFA;

(f) Reaffirmation of USA view that the Commission continues to have a useful role in present and anticipated circumstances, particularly in connection with subversion charges and increased patrolling;

(g) Undertaking to remind South Vietnam of need for cooperation with the Commission and in particular in the provision of information and abstention from harassment of Polish delegation.

3. Harriman welcomed our raising with him the problems of the Commission in relation to the new situation. As our discussion proceeded, it was clear that the State Department had well developed views, summarized above, on many of the points considered in various recent telegrams on this subject, especially those from our delegation in Saigon. It was, therefore, unnecessary for me to expand at any length on our own approach, although I did categorically (a) stress the need for South Vietnam cooperation with the Commission (2(g) above); (b) seek reaffirmation of USA and SVN intention to avoid specific notifications to the Commission (2 (c) above); and (c) invite confirmation that, in USA view, the Ceasefire Agreement should be regarded as of continuing effect to the extent possible (2(e) above). I also said that it might well be that our initial reaction in the ICC to the well publicized arrival of helicopters and crew in Saigon and the SVN letter of December [9] might be to seek "clarification" from the SVN.

4. Harriman said that he hoped Hooton would understand that it was the firm USA and SVN intention not repeat not to "get into the numbers game" as regards details of USA assistance. He hoped that the Canadian delegation could take the position that, because of the public nature of USA response to the SVN's request for increased assistance, there was no repeat no need for the Commission to report such a notorious fact; rather the Commission should address itself to the question whether this admitted USA increased assistance was justified on the grounds advanced by the SVN i.e. the massive subversion from the other side. In this connection Harriman drew our attention to the exchange of letters between President Kennedy and President Diem (texts in a following telegram).† This exchange of letters had been made public early today⁵³ and would clarify the basis on which USA and SVN governments were acting.

5. Harriman went on to say that it had been hoped in the State Department that the delivery of helicopters could have been less obtrusive. There had been a divergence of opinion on this question, with the State Department holding the view that the publication of the President's letter would be sufficient for the purpose of SVN "morale building." However, for physical reasons it seemed that the helicopters had to be introduced openly in Saigon (he referred to the fact that other unloading facilities were not repeat not available). He went on to say that more helicopters would be delivered in January and that transport aircraft would also be flown in. It was the intention to be as unostentatious as possible in making these further deliveries. However, in the case of the deliveries on December 11, it had proved impossible to avoid some show, and since the world had been told about it, it might be that there would be some advantage in terms of bolstering SVN morale.

6. It was at this point that I expressed the hope that the new USA deliveries and the SVN letter of December [9] would not repeat not be treated as a repudiation of the rest of the Ceasefire Agreement; the existence of the Commission and continuation of its functions had to have legal foundation, Harriman agreed that the levels contemplated in the agreement for USA

⁵³ Voir/See "U.S. Will Increase Help for Vietnam," *New York Times*, December 15, 1961, pp. 1, 5.