36 KOREAN CONFLICT

Heeney that you had told the House this morning that the Canadian Government would consult with other members of the United Nations on the part that Canada might play in applying the resolution in question. This, I think, is just the line they want other countries to follow in this connection.

6. I gathered from this talk that offers of assistance should not, in the view of the State Department, be addressed to the Security Council, which has no responsibility for directing the operations now in progress.

20. DEA/50069-A-40

Note du chef par intérim de la Direction des Nations Unies pour le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures⁷

Memorandum from Acting Head, United Nations Division, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs⁷

SECRET [Ottawa], June 28, 1950

This afternoon, about 5.30 p.m., Mr. Wrong telephoned me to let us know that his most immediate teletype WA-1422 of the 28th of June, reporting on a conversation he had had about an hour previously with George Perkins of the State Department, was on its way. In the course of the conversation Mr. Wrong passed on a number of points of interest which are not contained in his teletype.

- 2. In the teletype it is stressed that the State Department are anxious that the Canadian Government should announce some concrete measures as quickly as possible. When I said over the telephone to Mr. Wrong that there did not seem to me to be any mid-way point between such a statement as Mr. Pearson made this morning in the House of Commons and an announcement that the Canadian Government was sending forces to Korea (perhaps two destroyers), he said that in the State Department's view a highly valuable statement could be made which would yet fall somewhat short of the clear-cut decision to despatch Canadian forces. The Canadian Government could announce, for example, that it was prepared to make two destroyers available for the defence of Korea and would consult urgently with other members of the United Nations who are in a position to contribute forces, with a view to determining whether such vessels would be useful and, if so, how they could best be employed. This suggestion, incidentally, amplifies and elucidates the last paragraph of Mr. Wrong's teletype, in which he reports that "offers of assistance should not, in the view of the State Department, be addressed to the Security Council, which has no responsibility for directing the operations now in progress."
- 3. Mr. Wrong also had some information of interest about the present military situation in Korea. Perkins had told him that United States aircraft now operating over Korea were experiencing difficulty in finding targets. They were attacking whatever tanks they could spot. But they did not know where else to direct their fire since their communications with the Korean ground forces were highly ineffective. Perkins thought that it would be necessary almost at once to land some United

Mr. Heeney: Paragraph 2 is important. E. R[eid]

Note marginale :/Marginal note: