

and their seats of government, we should become acquainted with the most secret avenues of their power? Should we not then be always exposed to the effects of their jealousy? Would not the convoys be liable to be intercepted, our forts blocked up, and the garrisons starved upon the least variance with them? and would not the same differences still subsist between us and the French about the boundaries between us?

Both nations being settled on opposite banks of the Mississippi, might it not be the means of introducing a reciprocal trade very detrimental to the true interests of this nation? Would not there always remain a squabble about the sole property of the Mississippi? Would it not be a perpetual bone of contention? Would not both claim a right to the navigation of it? And as the French no sooner form a scheme, than they put it in execution, might they not easily interrupt the communication between our forts? Might they not cross the river, and make a conquest, not only before any reinforcement could be sent, but even before proper intelligence could be received of an attack; or if such intelligence was received before the necessary preparations could be expedited to relieve the garrison? We have an instance of this in the present war: how difficult has it proved to gain the least intelligence of the fate of Fort Loudoun? How many times was it reported to have been taken, and when it was taken, was it not with much ado credited?

Besides, Sir, what would be the consequence of confining the French even to the west of the Mississippi. The country, if we reckon to the parts inhabited by the subjects of Spain is of much greater extent than the habitable parts of Canada, the soil infinitely more