

that if one allows these sanctions more, something that is lacking in world leadership today, time, they will suffocate Iraq. They will run out of parts to repair their tanks. Common sense would tell us to give the sanctions more time to work.

Mr. Clark (Yellowhead): I believe I heard questions and not just commentary. I will try to answer both. I take very seriously, as I know the member does, the concern of children on this issue. It is obviously a matter which profoundly unsettles them more than it does adults. Everyone in this House wants to give peace a chance. The issue is how we can most effectively do this.

We have come to the view, not easily, that the best way to give peace a chance is to try to use the organization that is the only one we have and one which was established precisely for the purpose of trying, first, to direct the negotiations, for the settlement of this war by peaceful means and then to take other actions when those discussions appear not to work. Saddam Hussein would not go to see Baker or Bush, and when Aziz did, he would not even receive the letter from the President of the United States to be transmitted to the President of Iraq.

When the Secretary-General of the United Nations went on that arduous journey to Baghdad, he was turned away, turned away to the point that when he came back through Paris he spoke to other people who genuinely wanted to go if he thought that would be helpful and he said in effect they should not waste their time. The best way to give peace a chance is to use the instrument that we built to establish peace, which is the United Nations.

On the question of sanctions, unquestionably there has been some effect. But we are not aiming our sanctions at ordinary Iraqis who are working in the streets and who have enough troubles. Surely the target of our sanctions is Saddam Hussein and the military machine that he runs. I have seen no evidence—I have looked for it—that there is any appreciable effect upon his military capacity.

The Leader of the New Democratic Party, I believe, or someone from that party was, referring to observations by American officials—she has just been to the United

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States and has come back informed—referring to the possibility that something might begin to take effect in six months or in nine months, and that there might be some deterioration in some part of their military capacity. What happens during that time? We believe that sanctions are essential but sanctions are not sufficient. What we need is a combination of sanctions and diplomacy or sanctions and other actions when diplomacy has the result that unfortunately it has had, being turned aside so consistently by Saddam Hussein.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Speaker, first of all, I congratulate the Secretary of State for External Affairs for a very forceful speech. He was forceful 90 per cent of the time, unfortunately, in my view, to an argument that was frankly spurious. No one in this House disputes the need to deal with Saddam Hussein. No one in this House disputes the need to deal with Saddam Hussein as effectively as possible. The issue that divides us is how.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs in his last comment, in answer to the question just put to him, seemed to suggest, as I heard him, that there was no evidence that sanctions would have an effect on the military might of Iraq. With the greatest respect, that simply is not correct. The evidence before the United States Congress from the CIA, which has already been referred to in debate, suggests the contrary.

Even more recent evidence published this morning in *The Globe and Mail*, a reprint from *the New York Times*, which I assume the minister has had drawn to his attention, but if it has not then let me also put it on the record of the House. It is an article by Gary Hufbauer and Kimberly Elliott. It is a recount of a detailed study made of sanctions since the First World War. Of 115 cases studied, it was found that in 34 per cent sanctions were highly successful. It says in respect of Iraq that in all the circumstances sanctions would have an even greater chance of being successful. I quote:

Since the estimated cost to Iraq—48 per cent of its gross national product—is so far beyond that observed in other cases, the initial results placed the probability of success at nearly 100 per cent. Even when the model is adjusted to account for Saddam Hussein's exceptionally tyrannical control, and the estimated cost is, say, halved to 24 per cent of GNP, the probability of success remains above 85 per cent.