

*External Affairs*

and to the outside world is undergoing a very rapid transformation. The trends of thinking which we loosely describe as nationalism and neutralism are spreading widely and rapidly. In these countries these trends are there to stay.

No country could resist an evolving nationalism any more than Canada could. We must recognize these forces, which animate the leaders of the present in that particular area. These powerful tendencies may not always manifest themselves in a way that we would welcome, but we must accept the fact that they will continue to animate the new leaders who have arisen, and will therefore inevitably dominate the Middle East scene for some time to come. We cannot, of course, oppose this evolutionary process of change but there is an international responsibility to see that if change comes, it comes peacefully, with the consent of those concerned and without menace to the security of others.

Yet if we are justified, as I am sure we are, in our efforts to ensure that change is peaceful, we must recognize for our part that one of the chief causes of instability in the area as a whole has been a profound lack of confidence of each country in its neighbours, and a mutual lack of confidence between the countries of the area and those lying outside of it. Western countries may be able to help in establishing a basis on which that confidence can grow, though this will require restraint, patience, impartiality and a willingness to approach the countries of the area on a footing of equality and respect. It may be that, as in other areas, the United Nations can offer the best medium through which adjustment to the new order of relationships can take place; for this adjustment must be accomplished without sacrifice of principle and without too close involvement in the regional tensions which political, economic and social forces still at work in the area are bound to engender.

Canada's own policy continues, as in the past, to be one of firm support of United Nations institutions in the area. We were, for example, one of the main contributors to UNOGIL—that is, the United Nations observation group in Lebanon—and Canadian officers continue to serve with the United Nations truce supervision organization in Palestine. Support for Palestine relief and rehabilitation is also to be maintained this year, subject to parliamentary approval, at our annual rate of \$500,000. Finally, we can derive great satisfaction from the contribution that Canada continues to make to the United Nations emergency force in the form of a large Canadian contingent. It is, I think, a remarkable tribute to the success of

this unique United Nations peace-keeping activity that the secretary general was able to refer in his 1958 report on UNEF's activities to the "virtually unbroken quiet" which had prevailed "along the entire line between Egypt and Israel" during the period covered by the report.

Mention of the secretary general prompts me to pay once again the highest tribute to the selfless and tireless personal contribution that Dag Hammarskjöld has made to the cause of peace throughout the world, and nowhere more successfully than in the Middle East.

This brings me, Mr. Speaker, to some brief comments on the last regular session of the United Nations general assembly, at which I had the honour to head the Canadian delegation. As there are many important matters to be considered during today's debate, I shall confine myself to one or two items and impressions of special concern to Canada.

Having just referred to UNEF, it is appropriate that I report at this point on the related question of a United Nations stand-by force. Hon. members may be aware that at the 13th session of the general assembly the secretary general presented a summary study of the operation of UNEF, out of which he drew a number of observations and principles for consideration as a guide to future United Nations action in preserving peace through its own instrumentalities. The secretary general's conclusions reflected the tenor of the discussions concerning a United Nations peace force at both the special emergency session of the assembly in August, 1958 and at the 13th regular session in September, 1958.

In these discussions attention shifted from the possibility previously considered of establishing a permanent stand-by force as such, or earmarking national units for service with such a force; rather it was directed toward, first, the desirability of developing arrangements and planning procedures which would enable the United Nations to meet swiftly a wide variety of possible situations and, second, the need for agreement on a set of basic principles to govern the operation of whatever United Nations instrumentality might be created. In supporting this approach, the need for flexibility in the planning of stand-by arrangements was particularly emphasized by the Canadian delegation at both sessions.

In the course of the meetings of the external affairs committee last summer, I had occasion to review the history of attempts to establish an effective United Nations stand-by peace force. Opposition has been based on