

*External Affairs*

part of the world retaliation would be atomic? Would the effect of this new look policy be exactly the opposite of the effect which the United Nations strove to achieve in Korea in 1950, namely, to confine and localize the conflict and to prevent the extension of a local conflict into a world conflagration? Here, too, I think the statement of our Secretary of State for External Affairs led Mr. Dulles to give us clarification because in that same article in the April issue of *Foreign Affairs* Mr. Dulles stated:

To deter aggression, it is important to have the flexibility and the facilities which make various responses available. In many cases, any open assault by communist forces could only result in starting a general war. But the free world must have the means for responding effectively on a selective basis where it chooses. It must not put itself in the position where the only response open to it is a general war.

Again, he said:

This calls for a system in which local defensive strength is reinforced by more mobile deterrent power.

He added:

In every endangered area there should be a sufficient military establishment to maintain order against subversion and to resist other forms of indirect aggression and minor satellite aggressions. This serves the indispensable need to demonstrate a purpose to resist and to compel any aggressor to expose his real intent by such serious fighting as will brand him before all the world and promptly bring collective measures into operation.

He concluded:

That does not mean turning every local war into a world war. It does not mean that if there is a communist attack somewhere in Asia atom or hydrogen bombs will necessarily be dropped on the great industries of China or Russia.

There, Mr. Speaker, is another very important point that has been clarified as a result of the questions put by our Secretary of State for External Affairs. Yet another misgiving has been removed by the same cause. One question which I think suggested itself to many of us after reading Mr. Dulles' January speech was whether the new look policy would involve United States withdrawal from western Europe, whether it would mean a retreat into continentalism. There is no need for me to emphasize how serious that would have been, particularly in its psychological effect upon the continental countries of western Europe, and more particularly France about whom I propose to say a little more in a few moments. But here again we have an assurance from Mr. Dulles as found again in the article in *Foreign Affairs*. He says:

Moreover, the program does not mean that we intend to pull our forces out of Europe. It is, of course, essential that the continental nations themselves provide a harmonious nucleus of integrated defence. If they do so, the United States would

[Mr. Fraser (St. John's East).]

expect to maintain substantial forces of its own in Europe, both in support of the forward strategy of defence and for political reasons.

I feel that assurance will have a useful psychological effect, more particularly in France where, as we know, there is even now very great reluctance to ratification of the EDC treaty. We were all glad, I know, to note from the speech of the Secretary of State for External Affairs that substantial progress has been made toward the realization of that very important project, but we are all aware, as he himself pointed out, that there are still serious hurdles to be surmounted. Perhaps the crucial obstacle is France herself. We know that France fears the resurgence of German militarism, and I would agree with the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell) that we have every reason to sympathize with France. We know that she has been invaded three times in the last eighty odd years by Germany, that she has suffered grievously at Germany's hands. It is only natural that she should suspect the consequences of German rearmament, but surely the choice is not a simple choice between German rearmament and no German rearmament.

Sooner or later German rearmament would, it seems to me, be inevitable. The vacuum that at present exists cannot continue indefinitely and the true choice seems to be a Germany rearmed within the confines of an international system, international control, and a Germany rearmed outside such a system as EDC. Nor should we forget that the author of the EDC project was a Frenchman, Mr. Plevin, and that the best minds in France have seen in EDC perhaps the only solution.

Again, Mr. Speaker, I should like to point out that without some such form of international co-operation in western Europe, the defence of the continent will remain very weak indeed. Anything that can be done, therefore, to reassure France and to make her more likely to accept the EDC program seems to me to be an important step forward.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I should like to turn for a few moments from Europe to the Far East, and to join with other speakers from all parts of the house in welcoming the statement made by the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) on Thursday with reference to the recognition of the communist regime in China. I believe, and I am sure that many will agree with me, that statement showed a most statesmanlike approach to this very delicate problem. Personally, I was glad to hear that at present there is no intention to consider or even to contemplate recognition of the communist regime in China. I feel