

task of achieving measures to curtail competition in nuclear weapons. All of us in the international community must be fully conscious of the complexity of the problems the United States and the Soviet Union confront in undertaking even gradual and partial measures of nuclear disarmament, but we strongly believe they must make a more determined effort to surmount these problems. We appeal to the two principal nuclear powers again to move with greater speed towards the conclusion of SALT II and to move on to SALT III -- that is, from limitations to effective reductions -- at the earliest possible date.

Despite the appeals made year after year for almost three decades in resolutions of this Assembly, progress in recent years towards a ban on all nuclear-weapons testing has been almost imperceptible. The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 has not yet been signed by two nuclear-weapon states, and one of them is still engaging in atmospheric testing.

The achievement of a comprehensive test ban, like strategic-arms limitation, involves difficult security, political and technical problems and perceptions. In the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, many countries, including my own, have tried to contribute to the solution of some of those problems, particularly those that would have to be faced in verifying compliance with such a treaty. We hope the search for solutions will be advanced by the group of scientific experts established by the CCD this year to investigate the possibilities for international co-operation in detecting and identifying seismic events, but the work of that group will be more useful if it has the active support of all nuclear-weapon-state members of the CCD.

Although the CCD continues to grapple with the question of nuclear testing, it is difficult to accept that more resolute efforts have not been made by the nuclear-weapon states themselves to overcome the obstacles to a nuclear test ban. We fail to understand why, as at least one nuclear-weapon state has argued, movement towards a CTB is impossible unless all five nuclear-weapon states participate from the outset. Ultimately -- and sooner rather than later -- all nuclear-weapon states must stop their weapons testing in all environments. But what insurmountable obstacles prevent at least the two super-powers, and as many other nuclear-weapon states as possible, from entering into a formal interim agreement to end their nuclear-weapon testing for a defined trial period? When the two super-powers already have nuclear-weapon arsenals of such enormous magnitude and when their own capacity for destruction so greatly exceeds that of any other nuclear-weapon state, how can it be argued with any credibility that an interim testing halt by the two of them

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