

As to the first, I can only say - though I would like to say a lot more - that political co-operation and economic conflict are incompatible.

On the second difficult, however, I would elaborate a little.

New forces have swept across the Far East since World War II. Some of these reflect the pulsations of the international Communist conspiracy. Others are primarily related to the awakening urge of millions of Asians for national freedom and a better life. If we of the West are not able to agree on the distinction between these two forces which require a different approach by us, our co-operation in this part of the world may weaken and disappear to the joy and relief of those forces centred in Moscow and Peiping who are using foul means and fair to bring about just such a result.

This is an actual, and not an imaginary danger, because there is a real difference of view within our coalition as to the meaning of these Asian developments and on what our reaction to them should be. This difference involves, in fact, basic questions of Asian policy.

There is no dispute over the necessity of resisting Communist military aggression, so determined by the United Nations, or even, in certain circumstances, without such formal determination. There will, of course, inevitably be differences over the means for defeating such aggression and as to the relative contributions of those taking part in the operation. Korea is an example of this kind of difference which can be disagreeable without being fatal.

A far more serious dispute may arise, however - there are signs that it has already arisen - over the nature and extent of our collective obligations, if any, to defeat Communism, as such, in Asia.

There are some who believe that Asian Communism is an implacable foe, bound hand and foot to Moscow, and that to negotiate with it in any circumstances is futile and perilous. Therefore, they argue we must all do everything we can through governmental action short of all-out-war - but even at some risk of war - to prevent the appearance of Asian Communist governments; and to weaken and destroy them if they have managed to obtain power. This may require the active encouragement of and support for anti-Communist elements in Communist countries, and by continuing and strong support for any regime which is opposed to Communism, irrespective of its nature or its popular support in its own country.

There are others, however - individuals, groups and governments - who will have none of this policy. They feel that Communism in Asia, though it may be far deeper and more sinister than "agrarian reform", is a social, economic and political development, growing out of special Asian conditions and one primarily for Asians to deal with; that the only justification for direct Western intervention is when Communism expresses itself in military aggression. It is felt that our obligation in this matter is positive, not negative; not to intervene against Asian Communism, an intervention which would be stigmatized in Asia as Western