

These decisions have carried us a long way, I think, in the preparation of a unified defence system for the North Atlantic community. They are not, however, military decisions alone. A large part of their effectiveness, a large element in the strength of the North Atlantic alliance, rests in the fact that we are not taking decisions about defence unrelated to other problems, and that we are not concentrating merely on military preparations. In this connection I should like to read another part of the council's final conclusions:

In formulating their directives the council proceeded on the basis that the combined resources of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty were sufficient, if properly co-ordinated and applied, to ensure the progressive and speedy development of adequate military defence without impairing the social and economic progress of these countries.

That is a proposition with major implications, and we are able to state it with conviction not merely because we have adopted the principle of division of effort but also because we have written into our treaty, in article 2, a commitment to economic and social co-operation on a wide front. In the light of our determination to proceed with adequate defence measures and at the same time fortify the economic welfare of our North Atlantic community, which is such an important part of our defence, the consideration we gave to article 2 in London takes on a new and added significance. We all agreed that this article is a fundamental part of our pact and that the greatest possible value must be attached to the concept of social and economic collaboration in the North Atlantic community, which it embodies.

The question is continually being asked in regard to article 2 to whether or not we intend to set up some special machinery for this kind of collaboration among the members of the group. Well, it is too soon to answer that question; and of course we can dwell too much on machinery. We have a good deal of machinery at the present time. Sometimes we hear it said that we are going in for harness rather than horse. I think in our North Atlantic and European arrangements we have both horse and harness, and possibly we should concentrate on the production of hay. So at this time I am not able to state that any special machinery will be set up, as a result of our meeting in London, to carry out the principles of article 2.

I should like to explain the line we took in London on this point. There now exists in Europe a very effective economic organization of European states, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation or O.E.E.C. We do not wish either to duplicate the work of this body or to impede it, because it is doing good work. At the same time it seems quite clear that the economic problems of the western world cannot be solved by a purely European body. Yet we cannot suggest to O.E.E.C. that it should transform itself into a North Atlantic council body to make article 2 effective, because it includes a number of states of economic importance which do not belong to the North Atlantic alliance: Sweden, Ireland, Switzerland, Greece, Austria, Turkey, and above all, Germany. In these circumstances, it seems to me that it is extremely important that we should avoid putting ourselves, and the countries of western Europe, in the position of having to make a choice between O.E.E.C. and the North Atlantic Treaty machinery as an instrument of economic co-operation.

To avoid that dilemma, and as a constructive step forward, the governments of France, Great Britain, the United States