Another shortcoming of peacekeeping is that it depends on the cooperation of all the members of the UN. Yet, as Wiseman points out, this cooperation is often not forthcoming. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is capable of exerting its will over all the members of the General Assembly. As a result, the members will often opt for unilateral initiatives rather than multinational ones for managing crises. This may help to explain why, until the deployment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to Namibia in 1989, there had been no peacekeeping operation outside the Middle East since 1965.

These criticisms of peacekeeping are misdirected. To paraphrase Malitza, it is like blaming the anaesthetist for the failure of an operation when the surgeon doesn't show up. Peacekeeping is directed at ending, or contributing to the end of violence; it is not by itself equipped to resolve the underlying issues in conflict. For peacekeeping to be successful it must be followed by peacemaking, parallel political initiatives aimed at removing the reasons for violence.

Peacekeeping cannot by itself resolve conflict, nor was it ever intended for that purpose. The assumption has always been that it would be part of a larger process of conflict resolution involving peacemaking and peacebuilding. These latter two components are woefully underrecognized and underappreciated aspects of the UN approach to conflict resolution. In the next section of this paper we will examine a concept which has potential in both these areas. It may also have potential for incorporating peacekeeping into its implementation or, in turn, of being included itself as part of a peacekeeping operation.

Experience, Oslo, Norway, 12-14 December 1988, p. 19.

Henry Wiseman, *supra* note 21, p.7.