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ues to be a fundamental and abiding objective. Our aim is to stop all nuclear testing." In Geneva the United States and Soviet Union have not begun negotiations on a CTB, although the extension and eventual termination of the Soviet unilateral testing moratorium and General-Secretary Gorbachev's March 30 offer of a quick CTB Summit in Europe has meant that the issue has remained an important part of superpower relations and public debate.

On 26 February 1985 the US House of Representatives voted 268-148 in favour of a resolution that urged President Reagan to submit the Threshold Test Ban (TTB) Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) Treaty to the Senate for ratification. The resolution also called upon the President to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on a verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty.

Responding to the resolution, Reagan wrote to Senate Republican leader Robert Dole, suggesting that the two treaties needed improved verification methods before they could be submitted for ratification. "The actions called for do not serve the interests of the United States . . . They would undercut the initiatives I

until the next US-USSR Summit. In response Gorbachev stated his willingness to achieve effective verification methods, including on-site inspection, and extended the Soviet unilateral testing moratorium beyond its March 31 deadline. "We cannot extend [the moratorium] unilaterally forever. Having refrained from all nuclear explosions, both test and peaceful, for over seven months now, we have already paid a price both militarily and economically . . . The Soviet Union shall not conduct nuclear explosions after March 31 either until the United States carries out its first nuclear explosion."

As the Soviet moratorium was brought to an end with a US nuclear test on 3 April 1986, the CIA revealed that it was revising its methods of evaluating Soviet nuclear tests. In the Fall of 1985, a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) panel concluded that previous Government methods of estimating the yield of Soviet tests had been based on faulty assumptions.

Geneva Negotiations (Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations)

■ In a letter to Gorbachev on 25 February 1986 Reagan outlined the American response to the INF elements of the January Gorbachev proposal. After consulting with the European allies, Reagan suggested three options for a three-year plan to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe. In the first option both sides would reduce their INF launchers to 140, with a proportionate reduction in Asian-based SS-20s in the first year. In the second year both would reduce their remaining launchers by half and in the third year they would reduce to zero. The second option would eliminate all INF in Europe immediately, with Asian SS-20s limited to Central Asia (out of range of Japan). The US would be permitted to maintain an equal number of INF launchers in the US until all were eliminated by the third year. The final option calls for reductions

over three years of all INF on a global basis. The proposal rejected the Soviet condition that the French and British not build up their intermediate-range nuclear forces.

MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks, Vienna)

■ On 20 February the Eastern delegation tabled a new draft treaty, taking into account some of the provisions of the Western proposal of December 1985. The draft treaty suggested reductions of 11,500 Soviet troops and 6,500 American troops (the Western offer proposed reductions of 11,500 and 5,000 respectively), to be followed by a 'no-increase' commitment for three years. Three or four permanent verification posts would be set up on each side and on-site inspection on "justified request" would be permitted. The Western response stated that the draft treaty "failed to move towards the Western position on any substantive issue . . . [it] did not resolve the question of size of initial US and Soviet reduction figures, but rather attempts to perpetuate it in another form." (20 March 1986)

SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks)

■ The SALT II Treaty, which places limits on the strategic nuclear arms of the United States and the Soviet Union, was signed in 1979. Although the Treaty has never been ratified in the US, both sides have continued to comply with its terms. On 27 May President Reagan announced that "in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on . . . the SALT structure."

Early Warning

30 June - July 3	UN World Disarmament Conference, New York
mid-July	End of 39th Round of MBFR
19 August - 19 September	12th Session CDE, Stockholm
4 November	CSCE Review Conference, Vienna