

The New "Red Book."—III.

(Volunteer Service Gazette.)

Quarter-Column is formed from column as formerly, except that when from the halt the Captains' words, "*Left (right) Dress*" are not given until their respective directing guides have taken up their covering in the new formation.

In opening to column from quarter-column the Colonel's command is, "*Column from the front Company; Remainder, right about turn, Quick march,*" or "*Column from the Rear Company; Remainder, Quick march.*" In opening from the front the Adjutant will no longer mark the rear of the column, or, in opening from the rear, the point in front of the leading company as formerly. Opening from the halt by the companies advancing or retiring in succession is as before, but the same movement is no longer to be done on the march.

The rules as to diminishing or increasing front on the march require no observations. All reference to double-columns has, of course, disappeared.

A battalion in column changes direction by the companies "forming" instead of "wheeling" in succession. There is no other alteration except that it would appear that when the rear companies have to move by fours into a new alignment, their markers no longer run out to give points for the directing guides.

The wheel of a battalion in quarter-column is executed on the same principles as formerly, the leading company still "wheeling"; but the description of the movement has been entirely re-written. There are some alterations in detail. The Adjutant will be on the reverse flank of the leading company, and will regulate the pace of the guide on that flank during the wheel. The nearer Major will superintend the dressing of the leading company from the inner flank, and the other Major will look to the covering of the guides on the wheeling flanks. "A quarter-column should practise wheeling as the base battalion of a brigade in line of quarter-column, changing front on a central, or back on a flank battalion, the base markers turning to the outer flank."

The countermarch is done away with, but its effect may be produced by the companies of a battalion in column or quarter-column changing ranks, after which the Colonel will give "*Left (or Right) Dress.*" We are rather surprised to see, too, that the direction for "changing the order" of column or quarter-column, by the companies passing through each other in fours deep, is retained.

When a column (or quarter-column) moves to a flank in fours, "a company should be ordered to direct." There is no change in the regulations for wheeling in quarter-column, when formed in fours, to a flank. But when it is required to close or open in such a formation, the Colonel merely gives the caution, "*Quarter-Column on No. —,*" or "*Column from No. —,*" without any word to wheel. The companies move into their respective places independently, the whole receiving the command, "*Battalion forward,*" from the Colonel, when the movement is completed.

In the oblique echelon movements, wheeling is of course discarded, and the new alignments are taken up exclusively by companies moving in fours—the alternative evolution of the old book. There are no other substantial changes in the echelon movements. It should be noticed, however, here and elsewhere, that there is now no word of command, "*Dress up.*" It is always "*Right (left) dress*" only.

A battalion prepares for cavalry in line as heretofore, except, of course, that the flank companies "form" instead of wheeling, and that bayonets or swords are fixed by direct word of command from the Colonel.

The description of forming battalion square two deep from line has been re-written so as to provide for the movement of the companies which are to form the side faces, in fours instead of by wheeling. Similar changes have been made in the rules for forming two deep square from column and quarter-column. Four deep squares are entirely abolished. With the directions for moving in square, in which there are no changes, the subject of battalion drill virtually comes to an end, through the sections on Spring and Skeleton drills, formerly appearing under the head of "Miscellaneous Subjects," are now brought under that of "Battalion Drill." Skirmishing and the attack are, in the case of the battalion as in that of the company, deferred to a later part of the book.

(To be continued.)

Militia General Orders (No 3.) of 11th January, 1889.

No. 1.—ACTIVE MILITIA.

19th Batt.—No. 6 Co.—Memo.—All that portion of No. 4 of General Orders (2) 4th January, 1889, containing appointments to, and otherwise affecting, "No. 6 Company, Virgil," is cancelled.

Wellington and Napoleon.

Earl Stanhope, in his report of conversations with the Duke of Wellington, says: "I asked him whether he thought Napoleon wholly indebted to his genius for his pre-eminence, and whether all his marshals were really so very inferior to him?—'Oh, yes; there was nothing like him. He suited a French army so exactly! Depend upon it, at the head of a French Army, there was never anything like him. In short, I used to say of him that his presence on the field made the difference of 40,000 men. The French soldiers are more under control than ours. It was quite shocking what excesses ours committed when once let loose. I remember once at Badajos, when we stormed the town, entering a cellar and seeing some soldiers lying on the floor so dead drunk that the wine was actually flowing from their mouths! Yet others were coming in, not at all disgusted at seeing them, and going to do the same. Our soldiers could not resist wine. The French, too, could shift better for themselves, and always live on the country.'"

"Lady Salisbury asked which was the greatest military genius, Marlborough or Napoleon?—'Why, I don't know; it was very difficult to tell. I can hardly conceive anything greater than Napoleon at the head of an army—especially a French Army. Then he had one prodigious advantage—he had no responsibility—he could do whatever he pleased; and no man has ever lost more armies than he did. Now with me the loss of every man told. I could not risk so much; I knew that if I ever lost 500 men without the clearest necessity, I should be brought upon my knees to the bar of the House of Commons.'"

Lord Stanhope tells us that Daniel Webster told him that "he had been reading two or three odd volumes of the Duke of Wellington's despatches, and had been greatly struck at their total freedom from anything like pomp or ostentation, even in moments of the greatest triumph. The Waterloo despatch itself contained nothing about 'victory and glory.' So unpretending was it, said Mr. Webster, that Mr. Quincy Adams, who was our Minister in London at the time, and who had a good deal of bitter feeling against this country, with which peace had only just been concluded, declared on first reading the despatch that it came from a defeated general, and that in real truth the Duke's army must have been annihilated at Waterloo. This he seriously believed for some time."

"What a contrast," continued Mr. Webster, "to Napoleon's rhetorical bulletins! One day we read in them: 'We have thrown Blucher into the Bober!' And a few days afterwards one found that Blucher had somehow got out of this Bober and defeated Napoleon himself at Leipsic."

An account of the preparations made by Napoleon for the campaign of 1812 against Russia, is given by Major Liebert, of the German general staff, in the supplement to the *Militär Wochenblatt*. "The impression has more or less always existed that Napoleon entered upon this campaign without sufficient preparation, and that this in the first instance led to his defeat, and, secondly, also the want of discipline in his heterogeneous army caused by this insufficient preparation. This theory is, however, being dispelled the more the actual facts are brought to light. As regards Napoleon himself, the author says that one of the chief factors in his victorious wars was the thorough, systematic preparations that he gave to them, and his organizing talent, which enabled him to secure for himself a superiority of numbers. The principal share of the gigantic work of organization activity fell entirely to the Emperor, and his wonderful memory, his never-tiring power of working, and his investigation of all branches of administration, must astonish all who look closer into his undertakings."

It appears that Napoleon had actually brought into the field against Russia 608,000 men, 18,700 horses, and 1,372 guns. That was the result of the grand preparations which Napoleon had imposed on his own country and on his allies. During the whole of his military career he had not prepared any campaign in such a thorough manner as the Russian; neither before nor after had he been able to dispose of anything like those numbers. But even in the course of the present century we only see them surpassed in the year 1870-71. Napoleon seems to have greatly overrated his adversary, however, in expecting to meet him on an equal footing with himself and force him to a decisive battle; he could not arrive at this, and the wide field over which the enemy had to be pursued eventually caused his own break down. In conclusion, the author makes a suggestion for what might have been a correct manner of operating, which, as he says, is more in accordance with the modern German strategy of the years 1866 and 1870—viz., assembling of the too large army in divided groups, advance in a concentrated direction, trying to obtain partial success over the isolated groups of the enemy, and finally decision on one spot with united forces.

Daughter—Mamma, what is a man of war?

Mamma—It is a naval officer of course, you silly child.