

will see the means of preserving her commerce with America, which she now possesses almost exclusively, securing her colonies to be able in case of war, to invade the French colonies, and especially of preventing the union of the commerce and navy of France and the United States, upon which alone France can engraft her naval superiority.

It may be asked, why those jealousies which I seem so much to dread for France, have not taken place for England in possession of Canada? First, because Great-Britain has prudently separated her territory by a natural limit which prevents the contact of the two nations. While she occupied the western posts, the United States saw her with jealousy, and it is beyond doubt that hostilities and a national hatred would have been the consequence when the increase of American population in that part had taken place; when those forts were given up, numerous symptoms had already manifested themselves.

Secondly, because the usual road of the exports from the United States, being made, through their own rivers, there is an important communication between them and Canada.

But it is chiefly because Upper-Canada is inhabited by American emigrants who, in a case of a rupture, would join, according to all appearances, to the U. States, had not the spirit of their government been to prevent the extending of their limits.

But after all, what political or commercial advantage can France receive from the possession of New-Orleans, and of the East Bank of the Mississippi, that may balance the loss, which, in these two points of view, she will sustain in the rivalry with the United States? The Flori-

das are a narrow strip of barren land incapable of defence in case of a rupture and which will cost more than it is worth to guard, garrison, and the presents to the Indian Tribes. However advantageous, New-Orleans might be for the United States, it will be of very inconsiderable value to France, when the foreign capitals shall be taken from it, or a rival city shall be established on the American side. From the best information, I find that one third of the best commercial houses employed in New-Orleans, are American.—No sooner will a military government be established in the country, than all these commercial houses, with the capitals which support them, will pass into the United States, to that place assigned them by the treaty with Spain, or to the Natchez where every vessel which may go to New-Orleans may be received. Large vessels, from France, have already arrived there, and unloaded their cargoes without difficulty, and as the soil is so much the more advantageous as we penetrate further, there is very little doubt this establishment will soon rival that of New-Orleans, when the American capitals shall have been taken out of it.—When the United States shall have declared the Natches a free port. New-Orleans will be very little as a place of commerce, and only an object of useless expence for France, and an inexhaustible source of jealousy between France and the United States.

The cession of Louisiana is nevertheless very important to France, if she applies it to the only use which sound policy seems to dictate. I speak of Louisiana alone, and by this I do not mean to comprehend the Floridas, because I think they are no part of the cession. As it can by this cession acquire the right of carrying on the Mississippi a free trade, if she knows how to profit of these circumstance, by