

agreements developed to constrain proliferation. Analysis of costs should include resource costs as well as potential losses of sensitive and/or proprietary information; benefits should include assurance of compliance as well as confidence building through increased transparency. Determination of non-compliance will continue to remain a national prerogative; however, the call for international sanctions in the UN and other bodies may require the willingness to share reliable data on which non-compliance judgments were made.

Constraining proliferation is an international concern which needs "new thinking" and new initiatives.

- The role of the UN Security Council needs to be strengthened in order to constrain proliferation and resolve regional conflicts. More actions such as passing resolutions ordering mandatory inspections and embargoes will be required of the Security Council.
- Non-proliferation agreements should be viewed as major efforts to improve international security by setting norms of behavior.
- Non-proliferation strategy needs to address the "demand" as well as the "supply" side of the proliferation problem.
- Non-proliferation treaties must provide for challenge inspections of suspected activities on a timely basis, while meeting concerns about frivolous challenges, security risks, and economic espionage.
- The restrictive managed access approach negotiated for the CWC verification regime sets a precedent for more mandatory access which should be used to strengthen other non-proliferation agreements.
- The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) should be re-negotiated as an arms control agreement with a verification regime which would strengthen its effectiveness.
- CWC verification could be further strengthened by the addition of aerial monitoring using several sensor technologies and including air sampling.
- Because the BTWC verification regime does not meet the criterion of effective verification, verification synergies will be of particular importance in improving its effectiveness.
- The United Nations should establish a body for acquiring, integrating, and analyzing information from a variety of sources to assist in verifying compliance with multi-lateral and regional non-proliferation agreements. An international data base management system should be developed that not only collects information, but identifies those pieces of information which signal the need for additional verification activities.
- The IAEA would benefit by having its own intelligence/information assessment unit based on some form of international technical means (ITM). ITM data could provide synergies with future IAEA "suspect site" inspections at undeclared facilities.
- The charter of UNSCOM should be expanded, for example, so that it can become an international inspectorate, or a new, comparable UN body should be created for monitoring regional arms control agreements.
- The United Nations should give serious consideration to establishing a new permanent body which would perform expanded functions of the IAEA and UNSCOM for current and future agreements constraining the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

