

The proposition to Indianize Asia Minor is bringing out some most important facts with regard to the success of British Government in India. Awhile ago Mr. Lowe and Mr. Goldwin Smith made strong attacks upon the Indian Empire. They were not much heeded by the people, for it was evident, as most seemed to think, that Mr. Lowe and Mr. Smith had formed exaggerated notions of the value of having and encouraging free colonies. But now the matter has come to the surface in other shapes, and the pledge which has been given to turn Asia Minor into an India is regarded as a fair occasion for making prominent some of the faults that have been committed, and some of the dangers that lie in the way of the Government of India. And if report may be relied upon the situation is grave enough. Indian finance is fast sinking into collapse; and the burdens must yet increase rather than diminish, but the impoverished people can pay no more in the way of taxes. Millions of them are in a chronic state of starvation, and contentment from them can hardly be expected—for a starving people always and everywhere blame the Government, as we have lately seen in Canada. The discontent is helped on by the fact that all the tax-gatherers are foreigners. Those foreigners represent a country which the natives are beginning to find is not so powerful as they once imagined.

Add to that discontent the fact that powerful ambitions are at work among the people of India. Some of the many potentates are losing their old superstitious fears of Britain, and they are raising armies of their own. The Nizam's army is 45,000 strong, with 700 guns; Holkar's regular army is 10,000 men; Baroda has 20,000 soldiers; Scindia has 22,000, and it is believed that he could put 50,000 men into the field; the Rajpoot Princes have some 70,000 men; and the independent States of Cashmere and Nepal have about 120,000 between them. Two or three of the most powerful of those princes have a long-standing bitterness against England, and it really looks as if England will have more than enough in India without giving pledges for the good government of Asia Minor.

The English workingmen have been holding a Congress at Bristol. They admitted the depression of trade, but how to enjoy the same rate of wages by working the same number of hours as before was not quite plain to them. But they did hit upon a most excellent plan for getting hold of a most evident right and enjoying it when possessed: That every jury ought to have a due proportion of workingmen upon it in the interests of equal justice; and that, as they cannot afford to give their time for nothing, they ought to be paid at the rate of ten shillings per day. At that, one would hardly object to being an English workingman sacrificed on the altar of duty. Three pounds a week would certainly be a sufficient reason for calmly weighing evidence and the speeches of counsel before giving judgment.

But Professor John Morley gave light to the eyes of that Congress by putting before it the case of the Lancashire workmen against the Lancashire employers. He proved—what it was quite easy to prove—that the present stagnation in the cotton trade is the result of over-production. The manufacturers found roaring profits coming in and wanted still more, and so rushed into an extended production. Then the demand began to fall off. By famines, and bad harvests, and political uneasiness, the purchasing power of the world was reduced. To meet the difficulty, employers reduced the wages of their workmen.

That, said Mr. Morley, was wrong; this would have been better: "A temporary limitation of supply for the purpose of relieving over-production." There is something peculiar in Mr. Morley's statement, and I think something loose. He says that to reduce wages is to throw an unfair share of the burden of bad times on the workman; it is to tell him to shift for himself; it is to lessen the trade of the shopkeepers. But surely Mr. Morley cannot mean that to limit the production would leave the workmen unharmed? If they work fewer hours they must get less wages, or throw an unfair share of the burden of bad times on the employers. The truth is that the English workmen fancy themselves entitled to more wages and more leisure than any other workmen in the world. They must get rid of that idea, or continue to suffer.

Mr. Morley eschewed and denounced the protectionist "devil, and all his wicked works," but he was speaking before a Congress of Trades Unions, and what is the principle of Trades Union if it is not identical with that of Protection? Men banding together to protect themselves from employers and from the intrusion of foreign workmen, that is Trade Unionism; extend it and you have a country carrying out a protective policy. If that is not so, I should be glad of enlightenment; and I am watching the English papers for an explanation from Mr. Mundella—whom I have heard say scornful things of the "protectionist devil"—of the fact that long ago he removed a large quantity of

machinery from Nottingham to Germany, where he has been an extensive manufacturer for years under the protective tariff of the German Empire.

Prince Bismarck is showing the strength of his hand. The repressive measures now being levelled against the German Social Democrats, are also framed so as to strike at the German Liberals should they oppose the policy of the Imperial Government.

But the Socialists are the main danger to the peace of the Germans. Their notions are peculiar: to the effect that, as no man has a right to put another man to death, therefore they are opposed to war—except of a strictly defensive character—also to capital punishment. They do not recognise any privileged position—all privileges being, to their thinking, the result of an injustice in the distribution of the returns of that labour which is, or ought to be, done by all men alike. For "human labour is the source of wealth and civilization." They would have the returns of labour the property of society. They do not ask for a general and equal partition of this property—but for a community of capital. The programme, as put forward, is a strange mixture of wisdom and folly—but the folly predominates. EDITOR.

THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK.

It is difficult to form a just conception of the dangers that lie in the immediate future of our country. Every day makes it more apparent that the vote at the late elections was given in sheer desperation. The country did not pronounce for Sir John A. Macdonald, and it did not rise up in anger against the administration of Mr. Mackenzie: the spirit that ruled the masses was not one of disappointment or chagrin, but the expression of a feeling that, as times were bad in all matters of commerce—so bad that they could not well be worse, and might be better if changes were made in the tariff—an effort should be made to improve them. The masses never reason as to what Government can, or cannot do; they are caught by a cry and led by an impulse. In what are called bad times any Government must of necessity be at a great disadvantage; for it has to say: We are doing all that we can do—we cannot command the markets or fix the price of things—we cannot make labour worth more than its market value—and we are not able to compel capitalists to employ their money for the good of workingmen—we govern a free country and not a Slave State. But the Opposition can answer back: You are wrong—improvements may be made if you will only do this or that—that is, if the country will only give us the chance of doing it. And when this is cried in the streets loudly and persistently the people begin to imagine that they hear the voice of wisdom, and that promise may soon become performance. They said: We can hardly be worse off than we are; the Government confesses that it is powerless to bring about a change, that it is no more than a fly on the wheel, and the wheel will go spinning along of its own proper motion never at all minding the fly; but the Conservatives say they can be more than a fly on the wheel—that they can drag it—or stop it—or guide its course; probably they can do something—they shall try.

Sir John A. Macdonald and his followers have called up a storm which only great skill and great courage can command. Will the Conservatives exercise these qualities? Upon the practical answer depends the future of Canada. It will be seen at a glance that great are the temptations to act wildly and loosely. The Conservatives honestly believe that some changes in the way of readjustment of tariffs, and protection to some extent, will be of advantage to the country. But the more thoughtful among them know perfectly well that they have to be extremely cautious and careful in attempting any changes, and that violent measures would be fatal to the prosperity of the country: that they will have to make experiments, and perhaps have to retrace their steps a time or two. But the majority of the voters know nothing of that care and caution—they only know that they have been promised a bettered state of things, and they must have it, or turn upon their deceivers.

A dread of that turning will be ever before the eyes of the next Government. Whether Sir John A. Macdonald gave promises in a wild and extravagant manner or not, many of his followers did, and that in his name, and at times with his authority. Those things will be remembered, and pressed home upon the attention of the rulers. The query is—will the people be satisfied with the changes which prudence would dictate. Mr. Mackenzie might have made all the changes necessary and possible—even to the thinking of the best of Conservatives—but none the less would he have been swept from power. But Sir John's party is pledged not merely to the impossible, but to what—if only attempted—would land us in general bankruptcy and ruin. Will Sir John's party seek to redeem its pledges? If so, bitterness lies in our way.

There is another source of danger in the very natural desire of the leaders of the triumphant party to please, by giving offices to political friends and helpers. And I hear that Sir John is likely to have a large amount of work of that kind on his hands—for they are swarming in, and clamorous. It must be true, for the Montreal Gazette is making passionate arguments and lachrymose appeals, alternately, to Mr. Mackenzie not to fill up some vacant offices now at his disposal. Whether Mr. Mackenzie will take the advice of the Gazette or not only he himself can tell just now—but that he has a right to fill those offices is beyond reasonable controversy, and the hint given in the Gazette that they will be turned out of them is immoral—such an act would be infamous. Infamous, that is if the men are capable of filling the offices; just because it would confirm what many feared, but were not quite sure of, that the Civil Service is a tool in the hands of party politicians. Lord Dufferin spoke wisely and opportunely the other day at Toronto when he urged upon us the necessity for entertaining a high estimate of the Civil Service, and placing in it competent men. That will never be done if the Service is at the mercy of popular caprice. The men who are the hangers-on to a party, who are valuable for stumping or