

burden, nay, demands for its due elucidation the very strongest doctrine of penal substitution.

In this article we have space only to notice a few of the assumptions which pervade this book, and vitiates its conclusions.

1. That there is no such attribute in God as justice, in the ordinary sense of the term. It is expressly denied that there is any such attribute in God as requires "an exact doing upon wrong what it deserves." Bushnell speaks no doubt much of the divine justice, but with him justice and mercy are only different modes in which love is expressed. When it dispenses benefits to the wretched, we call it mercy, when it inflicts pain with a view to our good, we call it justice. It is this denial of justice in God, which leads Dr. Bushnell everywhere to ignore the element of guilt in sin. "Guilt is the relation of sin to justice. If there is no justice there is no guilt." [Hodge.]

With this denial, the whole theory of this volume must stand or fall. It vanishes the moment the reality of the divine justice and human guilt are admitted. For it makes no provision to expiate guilt and satisfy justice. It scouts expiation as a purely pagan idea. All it professes to do, is to renovate the heart. But every awakened conscience testifies that no removal of present impurity, can take away the guilt of past sins. Our own moral nature, no less than the divine justice, demands something more than the mere renovation of our hearts. The remorse which preys upon the guilty, the dread of the divine wrath which enters into all true conviction of sin, the feeling that God is just in condemning the sinner, which is an element in all genuine repentance, and the uniform teaching of Scripture, which declares that God "can by no means clear the guilty," unite to prove the baseless character of the assumption which pervades this book. It is sad to find a professed teacher of Christianity, leading men to build their hopes for eternity on such a sandy foundation. "The correlate of guilt," says Prof. Shedd, "is atonement, and the attempt to satisfy the specific wants of the sinful soul which spring out of remorse of conscience, which is the *felt* and *living* relation of sin to law and justice, by a mere provision for spiritual sanctification, however needed and necessary this may be, in its own place, must be like the attempt to satisfy thirst with food."

The provision made, in this theory, for spiritual sanctification is equally unsatisfactory.

2. It is assumed that moral power is sufficient to renew the human heart. In so far as the renovation of the soul is concerned, Dr. Bushnell does not appear to have "heard whether there be any Holy Ghost." He speaks of the Holy Spirit, but never to assign him any direct work in renewing the heart. If the work is to be done at all, it must be by the moral power which proceeds from the vicarious sacrifice of Christ. The sufficiency of moral power to renew the soul has been rejected, with one consent, by the whole Christian Church, ever since Pelagius first taught it. That man is in a position to be renewed by moral power can only be maintained in connexion with entirely inadequate conceptions of human depravity, as taught in Scripture, and revealed in experience.

That the moral power of the life and death of Jesus is very great we cheerfully concede. All that moral power can do, it will do. Bushnell expatiates upon it, as if it had never been fully known until discovered by himself. But it was known, taught and believed long before he was born. And it has been more powerfully taught by those who reject his theory, than by those who embrace it. According to Dr. Bushnell's view, there is nothing wonderful in the work of Christ. His Vicarious Sacrifice is "grounded on principles or universal obligation." Christ has "no superlative merit." He only did what he was bound to do, and what all boys