

placed this obligation upon them. I thought that the extent to which they had interfered or embarrassed Japan might be said to be in the circumstances, the minimum possible, and that for other reasons particularly their own needs and Britain's, especially in the war, the help that had been given China was of necessity near the minimum. That I did not think Japan had ground for any complaint on that score.

In regard to the freezing of assets being out of all proportions to what Japan was doing, I said when warships were brought into use and troops were moved that nothing could be considered as excessive as a means of defence on the part of either Britain or the United States. That Japan had no reason to anticipate any hostile act toward herself on the part of the United States or Great Britain. That we could only construe the use of force by Japan and her occupancy of bases in French Indo-China as a step in the direction of an attack on the interests of both the United States and Great Britain in the Far East. That anything of that kind could not be checked too quickly or effectively.

The Minister said that if the Prime Minister would allow him to say it, just between ourselves, he would say that there was no difference in what Japan was doing than in what the United States had done in sending troops to Iceland and taking Greenland and Iceland under her protection. I said that to outward appearances in the physical movement of men and occupation of bases this might seem to be true, but that there was all the difference in the world in that it was obvious the United States action was based on self-defence against Germany and that he knew as I knew that if the British Empire were defeated that Germany would lose no time in destroying other democracies and the United States in particular. That, indeed, already relations were such that the U.S. was considered by Germany as an enemy only second to Britain. Such was not the case with Japan. She had no reason to regard the United States or Britain as an enemy.

It was evident that Yoshizawa had two or three questions in his mind which he wished to ask for the sake of information. The first was as to whether Canada had acted on her own in this matter, or at the instance of Britain. I told him that the different governments of the Empire were in constant consultation with each other. That we regarded our position as one of common interest in whatever affected the security of any part, and that while we had conferred in anticipation of the situation that might arise, our action was taken independently and on our own.

He wanted to know next if what we had done with respect to China was at the instance of the Chinese or was that because of Britain. I told him that representations had come to us from Chinese sources themselves. That they wished to have this action taken.