

less contempt of the Mexican chief and the Mexican army for an enemy whom they supposed to be utterly incapable of facing them in battle, whom they considered as flying before them routed and dismayed, and whom they consequently expected to drive without resistance out of their territory. A casualty such as the Texans improved to the establishment of their independence might never occur again; a mistake or blunder of the same description is not likely to be repeated by the Mexicans, especially in a struggle with the United States.

In considering the probable results of a war with any nation, when we sit down beforehand to count the costs, we ought never to calculate on the *casualties* which have heretofore favored us; nor to expect that mistakes made by our opponents on former occasions will be again repeated. A wise statesman, in drawing conclusions from the past, will exclude all such matters from his calculations; or, rather, will make allowance for a large share of the casualties of war proving unfavorable to his country. For instance, a prudent man, in forming an estimate of the probable success of another war with Great Britain, would leave out of his account such affairs as the victory on Lake Erie, the victory on Lake Champlain, and the victory of General Jackson at New-Orleans; and also several of the victories at sea during the war. So far as any of these victories was determined by unforeseen casualties, he could not safely depend on the recurrence of these casualties. And so far as, on the one hand, they were occasioned by the foolish contempt entertained by the British of American prowess and skill, or by the manifest blunders of the British leaders; or, on the other hand, by the peculiar sagacity and intrepidity of individual American leaders, it would not be safe for him to expect a repetition of the reckless contempt and blunders on the one side, or of the same extraordinary personal intrepidity on the other. Now, were the proper deductions made for every thing of the kind which we have mentioned, what encouragement, in entering upon a new war, could be fairly drawn from the last war? Suppose the casualties should be against us, especially at the beginning of the contest—that our ships of war should, for a length of time, be so unfortunate as to encounter always a decidedly superior force, and that our commanders should be filled with as much vanity and contempt of their adversaries as the British in 1812, (a thing not altogether unlikely to happen;) that the intrepid Perry, and Decatur, and Jackson have dropped their mantles, when