

the refusal of the court below to submit the case to a jury was not erroneous. The court said that were the judgment of the court below to be reversed, then it would have to be admitted not only that a wife might acquire and hold property on her personal credit, but also that she might have and own, even as against creditors, the labor and earnings of her husband. The case did not come within the Act to protect the earnings of married women, for she had no such earnings. It is true she owned a house and lot, but she did not obtain the goods on the credit of that estate. The vendor was ignorant of its existence. The law of the State, as laid down in *Seeds v. Kahler*, is that while a married woman may buy goods on credit, it must be on the credit of her separate estate, and as against the creditors of her husband she must affirmatively establish that fact; though when she owns property sufficient in value to serve as the foundation of a credit, direct proof that the credit was based on it may not be necessary, for the jury may infer the fact from the circumstances surrounding the transaction. In the present instance there were no such circumstances as would warrant such an inference. Personally, beyond the signing of the notes, she was not known in the business. The whole matter was conducted by the husband, and without the slightest reference to her estate. The court below could not be convicted of error in refusing to submit to the jury a case so wholly unsupported by facts.

Since the decision of the above case a new Act has been passed by the State of Pennsylvania, which provides that marriage "shall not be held to impose any disability on, or incapacity in, a married woman as to the acquisition, ownership, possession, control, use, or disposition of property of any kind in any trade or business in which she may engage." There are, however, two restrictions: one is that she cannot mortgage or convey real estate without her husband joining in the mortgage or deed; the other is that she shall be unable to become accommodation endorser, guarantee, or surety for another.

SEARCHING WITHOUT A WARRANT.—The English *Law Journal* gives an account of an unreported case in the County Court, wherein the right of police constables to search the premises of a person suspected of theft, though they had not a search warrant, was in issue. There had been a robbery of poultry from the premises of F., and information of it was given to the police. Certain footprints were found at a distance of five or six hundred yards from the scene of the theft. On the same night there had been an attempted robbery from a neighbouring house. The footprints were traced thither, and thence to the plaintiff's house. They were principally along a footpath which the plaintiff frequently traversed. The officers went in plain clothes, and, without a warrant, searched the plaintiff's house and out-houses. No charge had been made against the plaintiff. The counsel who argued the case said they could find no authority expressly in point, and his Honour Judge Jordan, failed to find a case decisive of the point, but on the analogies of other decisions, on general principles of law, and on the opinion of text-writers, he based his decision in favour of the plaintiff. "Every man's house is his castle" is an old maxim, against any