

on the constitutional issues, the Secretary-General would be able to take on this kind of advance planning and co-ordination. If this proves impossible, we would be ready to consider, with our friends, how best to carry on the work begun at Ottawa.

On the central issue under debate, Canada has given full recognition to the primary responsibility of the Security Council and, in particular, to the responsibilities of the permanent members for the authorization of peace-keeping operations. We have insisted, however, that the General Assembly should retain its residual rights in this general field of international peace and security, in case the Council cannot act effectively. We are convinced that there is a common interest which can be found by serious negotiation and defined for the guidance of the organization in the future.

We have also laid particular stress on the necessity of a broadly-shared responsibility for financing. If it becomes the rule, voluntary financing by limited numbers of member states will undermine the moral authority of the United Nations. To achieve the greatest possible political effect, a United Nations mission, observer group or force should represent the moral commitment of as nearly universal a group of nations as possible. We recognize the special problems of the less wealthy members and admit the difficulty of compelling a sense of universal obligation, but if the final effect of compromise is that a comparatively few nations make the real effort, financial and otherwise, to meet the need for United Nations action, then the success of the action will be prejudiced from the start.

Finally, I would point out that we not only recognize the primary role of the Security Council in international peace and security, but hope that the Soviet Union would do something to bring the United Nations back to the real hopes of its founders in 1945. It would be an indication of a significant desire for co-existence if that nation tried to give meaning to the concepts of 1945 in the context of the realities of 1965, even in limited areas of the world. If the Soviet Union really wants to look again at the Charter arrangements for assembling forces under the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council (an organ which has never functioned), then we and others would be glad to consider how such arrangements could be made. If the Soviet Union really looks forward to an international force protecting a disarmed world, then I cannot think of a project which governments -- or peoples -- would view more joyfully.

There is a condition, however, to our support. The condition is that discussion of such projects should not be used to confuse, impede or delay urgent peace-keeping action or the achievement of a firm understanding now as to legitimate Assembly powers. Let us eliminate the debt, find equitable continuing financial arrangements, and define some powers. There will then be ample further opportunities for co-operation.

The majority of member states, in deciding not to insist on a strict application of Article 19 about voting powers, respected the position of a great power which could not be compelled. They expected that the Soviet Union would seek a statesmanlike solution that would both protect its legitimate national interests and take into account the wishes of the majority with respect to United Nations capacity for peace keeping. They gave the Soviet Union the