

*The Middle East*

The application of a system of multi-method, interlocking verification procedures ensured compliance with the Sinai II Agreement and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty following the 1973 October War. The methods included ground-based early warning systems, aerial and satellite reconnaissance, and on-site inspection undertaken by the parties themselves and by third parties, including the United States. To perform its early warning detection, identification and reporting functions, the United States established three watch stations staffed with civilian personnel and four unmanned sensor fields equipped with line, point and imaging sensors to scan the entrances to the passes, fixing positions and determining the size, speed, nature and direction of intruders. The automatic sensors incorporated the detection principles of seismic, acoustic, infrared, magnetic, electromagnetic, pressure, electric, and earth strain disturbances. In addition, and in accordance with the Sinai II Agreement, the United States carried out aerial reconnaissance, utilizing the Lockheed TR-1 tactical reconnaissance aircraft, every seven to 10 days, or whenever it received a special request from Egypt, Israel or the United Nations Emergency Force. Finally, Egypt and Israel maintained national surveillance stations located in the Sinai and provided their own aerial surveillance.

By its very design, the multi-method verification system in the Sinai created mutually reinforcing interlocking responsibilities which strengthened the viability of the disengagement process, and the synergies produced by the integration of individual monitoring components contributed to the creation of an effective verification system.

The peace process now under way in the Middle East will offer a number of monitoring opportunities and challenges. Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza could require demilitarized border zones and monitoring of exit/entry points to ease regional security concerns. Return of the Golan Heights to Syria

would most likely require demilitarized or "thin-out" border zones subject to international monitoring. Israeli troop withdrawals from southern Lebanon could likewise require monitoring and demilitarized zones which would need to be monitored.

Future operational constraints might include creating a demilitarized strip east of the Jordan River and banning deployment of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in that zone. A total regional ban on ballistic missile testing, production or acquisition may take some time to negotiate; however, if a ban were to be considered, co-operative monitoring applied to flight testing, production facilities and possible deployment areas could contribute to confidence in such an agreement. Monitoring the deployment of mobile missiles poses real challenges. While advanced technologies could assist in the process, technologies that could reveal the location of mobile missiles on a real-time basis could also provide useful targeting information, and thus they would be destabilizing.

Creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the region will require a long-term effort, but some first steps might be considered. In the context of significant steps toward regional peace, efforts at restraining Israel's nuclear weapons program could become more feasible. A freeze on the production of fissile materials within the region would be a start. It might be monitored by the IAEA, assisted by additional co-operative technologies. Over time, greater transparency might be desirable and possible across all weapons of mass destruction. This would call for such CBMs as exchanges of observation teams, seismic and non-seismic monitoring, monitoring by third-party NTM, aerial overflights for purposes of photo reconnaissance, or on-site inspections.

*South Asia*

Political and religious clashes, punctuated by border skirmishes and wars, have greatly constrained the development of political and military dialogue between Pakistan and India.

