

their good faith. The Agency's systems therefore may be effective in covering easy cases.

The second way in which safeguards are useful is to complicate the plans of potential proliferators. Safeguards create a risk of detection if certain proliferation routes are used and cause added trouble and expense if efforts are made to circumvent them. Subscribing to safeguards presents the proliferator with a legal obligation which must be violated or conspicuously terminated. If it withdraws from safeguards, it draws attention to itself; if it violates them, it bears the additional political burden if caught.

The third way in which safeguards are useful applies to states which avoid safeguards. Doing this highlights their lack of solidarity with the international community. They identify themselves as potentially worth increased national watchfulness at least, and possibly as the focus of efforts by other states to bring them into the safeguards regime.

Where defects in safeguards are concerned, but more generally where there are significant limitations on safeguards in terms of threats covered, there is room for both national and international monitoring. The IAEA should not be seen as the sole performer of monitoring functions, but rather as one body among many. Many states are not likely to be willing, as a matter of choice, to rely exclusively on an international body for verification of obligations with respect to militarily significant weapons. If a state were faced with a reassurance from the international body and a warning from its own monitors, it would at least be uneasy. Should the international body have effective challenge verification provisions its credibility might be strengthened, but never complete. Even in respect to challenge inspections, national monitoring capabilities would be desired as one means of generating the challenges. For states with relatively capable national monitoring agencies, the international body would be supplementary or secondary, even though it might have better access to some information. If both sources gave reassurances, the international body might seem somewhat redundant (certainly for states with high national monitoring capabilities), but this redundancy could be a virtue. National and international monitoring systems could be used to complement, if not reinforce, each other.

The Political Base

A safeguards system must have a political base that promotes the adherence and co-operation of states. In the case of nuclear safeguards, two elements of this base are supplier power and the existence of a broad norm or presumption against the spread of nuclear weapons.