

to Moscow." Of the Chinese Communists, Norman wrote that they "show signs of an almost Pharisaical pride in the purity of their Marxist theory. This tends to make them rigid."

Norman's enthusiasm for General MacArthur was fully reciprocated. "Our most valuable man" is the way the General once described Norman, and he volunteered to write Prime Minister King to request an extension of Norman's Tokyo posting. Brigadier General E.R. Thorpe, MacArthur's G2 and Chief of Counter-Intelligence, did write King in 1946 to say that "Norman has won the respect and admiration of all ... It will be difficult, indeed, to fill the vacancy left by his departure." Thorpe spoke of Norman's "profound knowledge" of Japan "and brilliant intellectual attainments." Many in the occupation command had read Norman's book, some several times over. His influence was certainly significant, with a strong emphasis on democratic reform and people-oriented policies; he rarely discussed economic issues, and did not advocate socialist policies such as public ownership or planning. His bias, if any, was liberal. While it is true that Norman had aroused the suspicion of General Charles Willoughby, MacArthur's other G2, Barros' statement that he was dismissed in January, 1946 is nonsense. In fact, he was needed in Washington as Pearson's surrogate on the Far Eastern Commission.

Willoughby, who mistrusted all the younger, liberal officers on the occupation staff, was himself controversial. Born "Adolf Weidenbach," and raised in Germany until eighteen, Willoughby had become a staunch admirer of Generalissimo Franco, whose picture adorned his office wall, and he retired to Spain. He leaked highly inaccurate, confidential information to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee that was pursuing Norman. Part of this related to Norman's role in the release of sixteen political prisoners, including two Communists who had been incarcerated for 18 and 19 years. In a letter to his family, Norman described the moment as "the most exciting of my life." He was subsequently able to demonstrate that he and his American colleague, John Emmerson, had been acting strictly on orders, but the witch hunters in Tokyo and Washington were never persuaded.

Canada had contributed no manpower to the conquest of Japan, or its occupation, and its diplomacy was focussed on Europe. It had relatively little interest, and less leverage, in shaping occupation policy for Japan. It was understandable, therefore, that much of Norman's reporting consisted simply of accounts of conversations with influential persons, notably the Supreme Commander. The situation changed with the invasion of South Korea during Norman's last year in Japan. He was authorized almost at once to place two destroyers under the newly appointed United Nations Commander, General MacArthur,