

against the background of all these light bulbs and connected main lines it is possible to understand the situation, even though there are also warning lights which either glow or blink. But when man constantly looks at this ... This is the simplest example. On a ship there are tanks of feed water, through which flows water of the second stage. A level indicator light, is used, but when the ice-breaker is being tossed about and the water in the tanks is being swished around, the signal light, which indicates that the water level has fallen, is frequently activated. Naturally, man gets accustomed to this. This is an example of how from constant and continuous information man becomes fatigued and ceases to perceive it.

We too are now busy studying the operator problem.

You ask, can an operator bring about a Chernobyl' situation? It is not within his power. He can stop the power-plant, switch on the reactor when power is required. But he cannot speed up the reactor - which is what happened at Chernobyl'. Such a possibility is excluded. Theoretically he can switch up the power control elements as high as he wants, but the negative feedbacks will not turn up the reactor to full speed. Speaking more simply, the power is not under the control of the operator with respect to the physics of the reactor. This is the fundamental difference between the marine power-plants and the RBMK.

Now we have begun to study how an operator can deliberately disable a power-plant, because precisely deliberate actions are needed here.