

(iv.) The two Governments, while maintaining their independence of action in their own protectorate, in accordance with the terms of the existing treaties, will collaborate closely and will act as far as possible on parallel lines in their respective zones.

(v.) Abd-el-Krim is to be removed from Morocco.

11. The "Petit Parisien" of the 11th July announced that, in addition, the Spanish Government had undertaken to occupy the whole of its zone; no mention, however, of this undertaking is made in the official communiqué issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It would seem, however, most probable that even if the French Government did not obtain so wide a promise from the Spaniards, they must have insisted on some sort of guarantee being forthcoming that steps would be taken so to organise and administer the Spanish zone that the events of the last few years should not recur, and that it should no longer be possible for a tribal leader in the Spanish zone to invade the French protectorate.

12. It would thus appear that, provided the operations still continuing in the Riff be brought to a successful termination and that those tribes still holding out be effectively subdued and pacified, the French will have every reason to be satisfied with the result of their campaign against Abd-el-Krim—a campaign which, it must be remembered, was none of their seeking, and on which they were forced to embark in order to defend the French protectorate. In the first place, Abd-el-Krim himself will have been removed from the zone, and the threat to the general security which his continued presence in North Africa will have meant would have been dispelled. In the second place, the French will have obtained some sort of guarantee from the Spaniards ensuring that steps will be taken in the Spanish zone to prevent any incident occurring which might threaten the security of the French protectorate. When it is recollected that the Spaniards were recently contemplating withdrawing to the coast and leaving the tribes in the interior practically to their own devices, the advantage of this guarantee to the French is obvious. Thirdly, it will now be possible properly to define the frontier between the two zones. Fourthly, the French prestige both in North Africa and at home has been greatly increased by the outcome of the campaign. Finally—and from some points of view, this is perhaps the most important point of all—the Riffian question, which had at one time threatened completely to disturb the *status quo* in North Africa and to reopen the whole of that thorny question for international discussion, has been settled without in any way altering the existing treaties or affording an opportunity for intervention by any third party. How anxious the French Government were to prevent any such possible intervention is well demonstrated by certain of the passages in the recent Quai d'Orsay memorandum regarding Italian adherence to the Tangier Statute, a copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 1467.

13. This satisfactory picture would have been very different had Abd-el-Krim accepted the terms drawn up in July 1925 and offered to him shortly afterwards. In the first place, there would have come into existence some sort of autonomous State in the Riff owing allegiance, it is true, to the Sultan, but in all probability very largely independent. The head of this State would no doubt have been Abd-el-Krim, who, whatever might have been his formal undertakings, would hardly have been likely to allow his ambitions to be curbed by any promise of submission to the Sultan. The existence of such an autonomous State in North Africa and the continued presence of Abd-el-Krim in the Riff would have been bound to have caused very serious embarrassment to the French, and would, in effect, have constituted a continual menace to the security of the French protectorate. Even though arrangements might have been made to suppress the arms traffic and to organise the police force in the autonomous area, it would probably in practice have proved difficult to exercise any effective control. Even though it was expressly provided in the Madrid terms that the creation of this autonomous State must not conflict with the terms of the existing treaties covering the situation, yet it might in fact have proved difficult to ensure that no infringement of the treaties took place. In any case, the existence of such an autonomous State, which, from the nature of things, would have been bound to have been hostile both to the French and Spanish Governments, would have tended to invite interference in the affairs of North Africa by third parties, and would have considerably increased the forces tending towards a revision of the 1912 treaties.

14. The Riffians no doubt lost a golden opportunity by not accepting the Madrid terms, but even the terms offered to them at Oudjda were still very favourable. It is true that the acceptance of these conditions would have involved the exile