

Inclosure No. 2 in No. 3.

*Message of the Governor on the North American Boundary.**To the Senate and House of Representatives.*

I herewith communicate for your consideration, a communication addressed to me by the Secretary of State of the United States, with the correspondence therein referred to, in reference to the North Eastern Boundary. This communication is made by request of the President of the United States, and in compliance with his suggestion, I ask your careful and deliberate attention to the facts and propositions therein contained. The duty devolving on me would perhaps be performed by the simple communication of these documents, without any remarks or comments of my own. But this subject, always interesting to Maine, has become more so by this direct application on the part of the President of the United States for the expression of the wishes and the will of this State in reference to the adjustment of this long pending question, and feeling a deep interest, personally and officially, in every thing that relates to it, and anxious mainly, that the rights of Maine should not be jeopardized or impaired, I feel it to be a duty which I owe to the people, who have assigned me my part of responsibility, to speak my honest opinions and views plainly and unreservedly upon the grave matters now submitted to you. I ask for my views no other weight or influence than such as their intrinsic value may entitle them, and I desire only to be regarded as connected with you, in guarding with watchful care the great interests entrusted to us, and doing my duty in this important crisis according to my best judgment. If my views are erroneous, or if I am in your opinion unnecessarily strict or severe in my judgment of intentions, or too limited in my suggestions of policy, I trust to you to correct or overrule me—I assume no right to dictate or control your actions.

In the communication from Mr. Forsyth, in connection with a very lucid and interesting history of the negotiations between the two governments, we are informed, that the discussions between the Federal Government and that of Great Britain have arrived at a stage, in which the President thinks it due to the State of Maine and necessary to the intelligent action of the General Government, to take the sense of this State in regard to the expediency of opening a direct negotiation for the establishment of a *conventional line*; and if Maine should deem an attempt to adjust the matter in controversy in that form, advisable, then to ask the assent of Maine to the same.

The grave and important question therefore presented for your consideration as you will more fully perceive by the document referred to, is whether you will clothe the Executive of the United States with the unlimited power of fixing a new and conventional line, in lieu of the treaty boundary.

It is certainly gratifying to perceive that the right of Maine to be heard and consulted before the treaty line is abandoned, is fully recognized by the General Government, and I have no doubt the Legislature of Maine will approach the consideration of the proposition in the same spirit it is offered, and with an anxious desire to terminate this long pending and embarrassing question; if it can be done without too great a sacrifice of honour and right. Although the documents are somewhat voluminous, the proposition is single and simple in its character and easily understood.

I have given to the subject all the reflection and examination I have been able to bestow, since the reception of the documents, and with a most anxious desire to acquiesce in any feasible scheme of adjustment, or any reasonable proposition for a settlement, I feel constrained to say that I can see little to hope, and much to fear from the proposed departure from the treaty line.

I think that the most cursory examination of the correspondence and movements on the part of Great Britain, must satisfy any one, that the leading objects which her diplomatists have had in view since the result of the arbitration, has been to destroy, or lay aside the treaty line—to lead us away from the clear, unambiguous, definite terms of that treaty—and involve us in interminable discussions, propositions and replies in relation to conventional lines, no one of which would be acceptable unless it gave to them a large part of our territory.

We find that in May 1833, very soon after the President in pursuance of the advice of the Senate had opened a new negotiation to ascertain the line *according to the Treaty of 1783*—to which treaty line, the negotiation of course was confined, the British Minister suggested, "That this perplexed and hitherto interminable question could only be set at rest by an abandonment of the *defective* description of boundary contained in the Treaty, and by the two Governments mutually agreeing upon a *conventional line* more convenient to both parties."

The same intention is apparent in the refusal to acquiesce in the proposition to refer the settlement of the treaty line to a commission, to be constituted of an equal number chosen by each party, with an umpire to be designated by a friendly power from the most skilful men in Europe; or secondly, that the commission should be entirely composed of such scientific men in Europe, to be selected by some friendly power, to be attended in the survey and view of the country by agents appointed by the parties.

It was in answer to this proposition, that the suggestion of the impracticability of the treaty line was made, and the intention became apparent to lead us away from that inconvenient obstacle to their wishes and plans—the treaty language. The proposition was so equitable and fair—so just to all parties, and so full of promise of adjustment upon proceedings satisfactory to us, that it could not be peremptorily rejected.

But although it was entertained, the answer to it clogged the proposition with so

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