

influence of the English and Scotch graziers are exerted against the introduction of our cattle, but these must ultimately yield to the force of circumstances.

To show the absurdity of some of the objections raised against our cattle by British graziers, we may mention the fact that a Canadian dealer had to dispose of a lot in London at £12 10s. a head, instead of getting £15 or £16, because the rumor was circulated that his beasts *would not eat grass*! One very gratifying fact in connection with this trade, and which to some extent is calculated to ensure its permanency, is, that live stock, like men and women, are improved in condition by a sea voyage. The gradual initiation of the animals to ship-board and sea-weather by going down the St. Lawrence river, and the circumstance of Montreal being nearer the points from which Canadian cattle are sent than New York and other American ports are to the far west, affords an advantage to Canadian over American cattle which must exclude serious competition from that quarter.

In order to show how dependent Great Britain is upon transmarine cattle for its meat supply, we have only to compare the average number of horned cattle there with the number here. According to the census of 1871, the four older provinces of the Dominion contained over two and a half millions of horned cattle. At the present time the number of horned cattle is probably much larger, as cattle-breeding has been largely gone into since the taking of the census. In Great Britain the number of cattle at present is considerably under six millions, and this has been about the average number for some years past. Thus, Canada with a population of under four millions possesses nearly three million head of cattle, while Great Britain with a population of considerably over thirty millions possesses less than six million head of cattle. Until the exportation of cattle from this continent began, the United Kingdom was wholly dependent upon European countries for the complement to its beef supply, and the pastures of Flanders are continually covered with herds collected for shipment to British ports. These cattle, however, labor under the disadvantage of being slaughtered at the port of landing immediately on arrival, in accordance with recent imperial legislation, while transatlantic cattle do not. This, however, is an adventitious circumstance, which may be changed at any time, and Canadian cattle breeders and dealers will have to base their claim to especial favor in the British market upon the more substantial grounds of superior quality and more reasonable

prices. That they can offer the latter is already apparent, for the importation of transatlantic cattle has already brought down the price of meat very considerably, and, in regard to quality, a large proportion of the Ontario and Quebec cattle rank in the London market as equal to Scotch prime.

The rate of freight, we consider, is altogether too high at present, something like £6 sterling being the cost of the space required for each beast, and 10s. for each sheep, the exporters providing the stalls, the provender and the attendants, the shipowners being only responsible for a proper supply of fresh water. But we attribute this to the fact of our steamship companies not being fully prepared for the new traffic; and, when the vessels which are being made expressly for this trade be afloat, we doubt not that the cost of transportation will be considerably reduced. The rate of insurance will also be likely to go down when the trade becomes properly systematised. The insurance against total loss by an accident to the ship is at present about  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., which is reasonable enough, but insurance against mortality is from  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. to 3 per cent., which is a heavy tax upon the exporter.

#### THE BOUNDARY QUESTION.

Britannicus has addressed a fourth letter to the *Gazette*, and we learn from it that he has read our articles on the Boundary Question. We do not discover that he has made any attempt to impeach the grounds on which the award was made. He has simply stated the extreme pretensions of the Hudson's Bay Company, without even noticing the opinions given by authorities on the other side. Britannicus has in fact pleaded the cause of one of the parties before the arbitrators, forgetting that the learned counsel in the case had already performed that duty. Britannicus seems to us to be under the delusion that he really has attempted to controvert the arguments brought forward to justify the award, if we may judge by his remark that there is "only one other statement of fact uncontradicted," viz.: "the enormous cost of surveys." Britannicus undertakes to disprove the argument in favor of a natural boundary by affirming that, if the height of land had been adopted as the boundary, the cost of surveys would have been small. It is strange that Britannicus does not perceive that, before deciding on the Albany and English River natural boundary, the arbitrators had decided on the north-eastern and south-western points of departure. The boundary which involved the cost of

surveys was a line produced due north on the meridian of the north-western angle of the Lake of the Woods, until it intersected a line produced due west from the north-eastern boundary on James Bay. Perhaps Britannicus will explain what would be the cost of surveying such a line. We find nothing in the letters of Britannicus requiring further explanation.

We turn with pleasure to the consideration of a further article on the subject in the *Monetary Times* of Toronto. It may appear hypercritical for us to offer further explanation to a writer who has candidly acknowledged that the arbitrators "cannot be said to have done injustice either to Ontario or the Dominion," and that "if the work had to be done over again we fail to see in what respect it could be materially improved." The *Monetary Times* has, however, as it seems to us, fallen into an error as to the grounds on which the arbitrators decided on the south-western point of departure. He apprehends that "the arbitrators seem to have placed some, perhaps undue, stress upon a map which had been specially compiled for their information."

This is an error caused by the assumption that the arbitrators felt bound to establish the boundary line on the meridian of the source of the Mississippi. The writer in the *Monetary Times* concurs with the arbitrators in their unanimous decision that the Mississippi river was the boundary contemplated by the Act of 1774. He says: "That this was a correct decision, we have not a shadow of doubt." He proceeds to argue that the arbitrators should have looked to the longitudes of Turtle Lake and of the north-west angle of the Lake of the Woods rather than to the map. Now the answer to this is very simple. The arbitrators had no occasion whatever to rely on any map. The north-western angle of the Lake of the Woods has been clearly established by the international boundary line commissioners, and a monument has been erected there. It was not selected on the ground that it was due north, or nearly so, of Turtle Lake. The writer in the *Monetary Times* has made no reference whatever to a document that the arbitrators felt that they could not ignore, viz.: the first commission issued by the Crown to Sir Guy Carleton (Lord Dorchester) after the treaty of peace with the United States. The date of this commission was 22nd April, 1786. It declares very specifically the boundaries of the Province of Quebec as altered by the treaty with the United States. Commencing at the eastern boundary, it traces it through Lakes