

fully through the contest waged by the United States in the expectation of an easy conquest.

The success of the british arms in Spain and consecutively in France, left at the disposal of the government of England a large force, which being transferred to Canada, in 1814, it was believed might now be advantageously employed in offensive operations, and here commenced the evil. The defensive was a successful policy; the error lay in the departure from it. In a pamphlet, published in London, 1823, recently put into the author's hands, intituled,—“Some account of the public life of lieutenant-general Sir George Prevost, bart., particularly of his services in the Canadas,” there is the following extract from a despatch of the 3d June, 1814, from the colonial minister, earl Bathurst, to Sir George Prevost, explaining to him the objects contemplated by the reinforcements which were then on their way from Bourdeaux to Canada:—

“The object of your operations will be, first,—To give immediate protection, secondly, to obtain, if possible, ultimate security, to his Majesty's possessions in America. The entire destruction of Sackett's Harbour, and the naval establishment on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain, come under the first description.”—Should there be any advanced position on that part of our frontier which extends towards Lake Champlain, the occupation of which would materially tend to the security of the province, you will, if you deem it expedient, expel the enemy from it, and occupy it by detachments of the troops under your command,