

this small planet, its responsibilities relating to nuclear expansion.

Mr. Andrew Brewin (Greenwood): Mr. Speaker, I thank the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Jamieson) for sending me a copy of his statement. It is admirable in its rhetoric; unfortunately its substance is somewhat dubious. I understand that the key to the statement concerns shipments to non-nuclear states. In future contracts will be restricted to those which ratify the non-proliferation treaty or otherwise accept international safeguards. In our view the important question is, how enforceable are these safeguards? I presume the international safeguards referred to in the statement are those administered by the IAE in Vienna, an organization which has inadequate staff to do the required policing and inspection.

We think that we should consider the question of alternatives. First, we believe that we should not enter into an agreement with a country which will not sign the non-proliferation agreement. Surely that is an important statement of intent. Such countries should also accept full inspection, not only by the IAE, but by Canada, and should accept Canadian control of radiation waste. These should not be alternatives. If we do not have that minimum assurance, we have no assurance. We would depend, as the previous minister said, on the good will and good intent of the people signing such agreements. In the world of today that is definitely not enough. There are many unstable countries in the world today; with unerring skill the government has picked the most unstable to which to ship nuclear reactors. I am referring to South Korea and the Argentine.

The British not long ago appointed a royal commission to look into the entire question of the development of nuclear energy. It reported recently, and pointed out that a major danger in the proliferation of nuclear reactors is the danger that terrorists, or those who exercise illegal powers within states, will obtain control of some waste materials and transform them into plutonium and nuclear weapons. They think that is one of the major dangers. And what have we done? We are to supply a reactor to the Argentine, a country in which, admittedly, extra-legal bodies wander around enforcing the law. In that country the machinery of law enforcement is out of control.

I will not pause to suggest that apparently we are working hard to secure contracts which will provide us with a deficit. I do not know if it has been proved that moneys paid to agents were used for bribery; but if that is true it is most strange. We are one of the few countries in the world which has ever paid money to secure unprofitable contracts. The same remarks apply to Korea. Anyone who has studied the situation in South Korea as well as North Korea will know that the authorities there have, without concealment, indicated their willingness to use force to suppress the freedom of their own people.

● (1540)

The international strategic studies dealt with this whole question. They said that in their view the attempt to control

the spread of nuclear proliferation was a promising attempt, but not a radical barrier. I want to say that I think we have here a credible intent but not a radical barrier.

I understand we are dealing now with Japan, Switzerland, and the EEC countries through Euratom. I would like the minister to tell us, if he can, just what is the situation with regard to our nuclear dealings with those countries. Have they ratified, or do they propose to ratify before the deadline which expires on December 31 agreements on that subject?

I conclude by saying that this is indeed a step forward. In so far as it is a step forward, I congratulate the minister and the government. Using the very language that is used here about the overriding priority, the importance of actions rather than words, and the fact that this issue we are discussing affects world economic growth and world peace, I say to the minister that this is only a step. I think it was the hon. member for Don Valley (Mr. Gillies) who said it was a faltering step.

We are engaged in a long process. Let us not fool ourselves by thinking that what we have done here is indeed the answer to the problem.

[Translation]

Mr. Charles-Eugène Dionne (Kamouraska): Mr. Speaker, I listened very carefully to the statement of the Minister of External Affairs (Mr. Jamieson) which I support without reservation.

I noticed, among other things, the passage in which it is said that Canada unilaterally decided to reinforce its safeguards requirements. On this matter, I support the minister's statement personally and on behalf of my colleagues.

[English]

Mr. Lawrence: If you will allow me, Mr. Speaker, I will put two or three short questions about merely one sentence in the whole statement by the minister. It is the only sentence that really means anything. It states: "Shipments to non-nuclear weapon states under future contracts will be restricted to those which ratify the non-proliferation treaty or otherwise accept international safeguards on their entire nuclear program." My three or four questions relate only to that one sentence.

First, where does this leave the Pakistani situation, the supply for the CANDU reactor outside of Karachi? My understanding is that Pakistan has not signed the non-proliferation treaty. If we can believe the president of Pakistan in his public statements, reported by reliable news services and wire services of the world, he has no intention either of accepting anything covered by such an ambiguous statement or accepting international safeguards on their entire nuclear program. Where does this leave the Pakistani supply?

Second, why does this have to relate to future shipments only? Everything else around here seems to be done in a retroactive way. Why are these restrictions not being applied to Argentina and South Korea, for example?

My final question is, what does the government mean by international safeguards? Is it talking about those rather vacuous and meaningless regulations coming out of the Vienna