

the past ten years at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna. There is today some sign of movement in those talks, but at far too slow a pace. Hard questions remain to be resolved. That is why I explored, with my colleagues in the Alliance, ways to break the deadlock in Vienna, ways to give fresh political impetus to the MBFR talks.

Another negotiating forum will open soon in Stockholm, this January. Its lengthy title, showing the complexity of its task, is the "Conference in Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe". It is imperative that this conference not lose its way in litigation about procedures, or in the linguistics of technicality. In other words, we don't have to follow the same path with this conference, on disarmament in Europe, to which countries attach so much importance, as we have followed in the Vienna negotiations where, as I have said, we have talked for ten years without really arriving at an agreement. I have therefore proposed that we consider the merits of high-level political representation at the very start of the Stockholm negotiations. You see, I come back always to the notion of the third rail, the need to inject political will, and the presence of political people, into these debates. They have become debates among technicians, among weighers of balances, among nuclear accountants. These technical quarrels can harm the process, rather than giving it a real push, a political impetus, which I call the third rail.

Finally, a fourth element in my initiative flows from the strategy of suffocation which I first proposed to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. That strategy — which still requires, and awaits, the support of the five nuclear powers for its implementation — needs further elaboration to keep pace with technological advances. Arms control measures must address those new technologies which, by their very nature, would make stability a more elusive goal.

I have in mind a ban on the testing and deployment of those anti-satellite systems designed to operate at high altitude. Such weapons could attack the global communications which are of critical importance for crisis management. Destruction of the other side's command and control network, at a time of crisis, would leave him blind and mute at the very moment when stability demands awareness and response, not the panic reaction of "launch on warning".

That is the fear we have, when we think of destabilizing weapons of that kind. These are weapons or techniques which make an adversary feel unable or ill-equipped to respond to a nuclear attack from the other side. Whether the fear is that one's communications system will be disrupted, or that one's weapons will be rendered useless, the danger is that, in a moment of crisis, the side which feels threatened will launch its nuclear missiles before the other side has a chance to strike first. It is this fear which is aggravated by destabilizing technical advances such as high-altitude anti-satellite weapons.

Neither superpower has yet developed an anti-satellite system for high altitudes. An agreement not to do so is, therefore, still possible. No agreement means vast expenditure by both sides — funds better spent on more worthy projects. No agreement means a further spiral of competition — a competition particularly vulnerable to accident or miscalculation. Moreover, an agreement could encourage movement toward negotiations about anti-satellite weaponry designed to operate at lower altitudes.

I am also concerned about another potentially destabilizing development, which is the possibility that