

"We cannot do away with disunity over policy and action when the real divergence is in the realm of philosophy. At best we can merely bridge the gaps by practical compromises. But the wider the gaps and the deeper they run the harder they are to bridge. The place to seek unity, then, is below.

"Fortunately, the philosophical questions on which we differ (he was writing about Western co-operation) are few by contrast with our consequent differences on practical issues. The difference which chiefly accounts for our disunity on foreign policy today, I think, is that between those who tend to give primacy to ideological considerations and those who are disposed to put strategical considerations first...."

Those who, in Mr. Halle's phrase, give "primacy to ideological considerations" are likely to see the situation in the Far East primarily in terms of the necessity of destroying communism; especially, of course, in China, where it has seized control of the state by methods which we condemn and for purposes which we have reason to suspect. To this objective, other things, such as the economic and political problems of Japan, the exploitation of natural differences between Peking and Moscow, problems of trade in the Pacific, the strengthening of friendly political and economic relationships with the uncommitted countries; all these take second place. The struggle is primarily a moral and ideological one; against Chinese Communism as such, and the crimes which it has committed.

In the United States this ideological aspect of Far Eastern policy is very strong; stronger, perhaps, than the strategical and political, though, of course, not uninfluenced by these latter considerations. It makes a strong appeal to our ideals and our emotions and strong voices make sure that this appeal is both loud and widespread.

Among the European friends of the United States, however, there is perhaps less of the ideological and more of the political, or, if you like, of the pragmatic approach to these problems of the Far East. There is more of rationalizing and less of moralizing; more of a desire to achieve a limited practical objective and less of insistence on total victory. There is, I think, among all the Western allies, general acceptance of the view that the Peking Government represents a foreign and reactionary ideology which, in its actions, has offended, indeed outraged our deepest moral and humanitarian feelings. There is no such general acceptance of the best way of dealing with it.

On the one side, and it may be an oversimplification to call it the American side, there is uncompromising and active hostility and, irrespective of the effect of this attitude on our relations with other free nations of Asia, a determined