

may be shared in common throughout a coalition, yet the emotions and passions of political moods are usually limited to a single country; at times, indeed, to a section thereof.

As Gouzenko, and Kravchenko, and Petrov, and many others have proved, the free individual is the Achilles' heel of totalitarianism. But a democratic coalition also has its Achilles' heel; in the temptations, which can beset any democratic politician, to yield too much to expediency, to the claims of immediate time and place and circumstance.

Above all, if we are to make a coalition work, we must accustom ourselves to living with requirements and within a framework, broader than that of our own state.

This will apply, of course, to the economic as well as to other aspects of policy. Excessive economic nationalism, if unchecked, will sooner or later corrode any coalition, and weaken until it destroys co-operation and unity in foreign or defence policies. Attitudes to neighbours and allies cannot be kept in water-tight compartments.

Finally, those peoples within our coalition whose strength gives them a position of leadership have a special obligation to cultivate self-denying qualities of patience, restraint, and tolerance. In their turn, the smaller and less strong members will have to demonstrate, not a surrender of their identity or free judgment, which would be undesirable and impossible, but a sense of proportion and accommodation and a recognition that the acceptance of leadership and the possession of power warrant special influence and weight in the counsels of the coalition.

An acceptance of the over-riding claims of unity, and the acceptance of the delays and concessions which are sometimes necessary to cultivate it, come hardest, of course, to the strongest: for a consciousness of strength naturally encourages self-confidence and is apt to induce a tendency to take for granted the acquiescence of others. The less strong members of a coalition probably find it easier than the stronger to be conscious of the anxieties and attitudes of others; and easier also to recognize the perils of disunity within the greater society of which they form a part.

The importance of doing what we can to strengthen the unity and cohesiveness of our Atlantic coalition is, in one sense, then, a new, though a very important principle of Canadian foreign policy. In another sense, however, it is merely a new expression of something that always has been considered a main objective of that policy; good relations and close co-operation between the United Kingdom and the United States. Canada's absorption in this objective is as old as the Canadian nation. That is why Mr. Reid stated as his second principle that Canadian foreign policy was, in the main, not a matter of Canadian relations to the League of Nations, but of Canadian relations to the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

The first part of that statement does not apply today for we take the United Nations far more seriously than ever we did the old League. But the latter part remains