

This is not the place to describe the characteristics of peacekeeping forces as they were defined by Mr. Hammarskjold in the light of the UNEF experience. What I wish to emphasize is that the lesson we drew from our participation in the Force was a further refinement of the earmarking idea. In addition to the desirability of governments themselves earmarking contingents for peacekeeping we concluded that the U.N. Secretariat must be enabled to plan ahead in advance of the next emergency. It was just 10 years ago that the present Prime Minister of Canada proposed in an article which appeared in Foreign Affairs that governments be invited to signify a willingness to contribute contingents to the U.N. for noncombatant purposes and that some central U.N. machinery be created to make advance arrangements and to direct future operations. Since 1957 Canada has herself made arrangements for units of her armed forces to be on standby duty for possible service with the U.N.

Canada still participates in the U.N. Emergency Force 10 years after its formation. The nature of our contribution has changed as the size of the Force has diminished. Yet the circumstances which brought about its despatch to the Middle East have not appreciably changed. Two questions arise. What have we learned about peacekeeping during these 10 years? If the U.N. is to stay in the peacekeeping business, and experience suggests it will, how is responsibility for this task to be shared amongst the member states?

Let me first try and summarize what we have learned, based not only on our participation in UNEF but on our subsequent participation in the Congo Force, the Cyprus Force and in a number of U.N. Observer Groups sent to patrol frontiers and supervise ceasefires. The first conclusion to be drawn is that each operation is different and that no standard political guidelines will serve to prepare for the next. In the Middle East, for example, we have been called upon to supply a variety of needs including administrative and