

in Figure II are cast broadly, the goal is to capture all the elements that could bear directly or indirectly on policies towards non-proliferation, arms control and confidence and security-building, through an examination of such issues as the importance of domestic political traditions of openness and transparency (ie: do citizens have access to information), the relevance of concepts such as "face" or "status" in negotiating contexts, the existence of new and old security threats and challenges (terrorism, drugs, resources, border incursions, etc.), or the acceptance of the conceptual baggage of confidence and security-building processes.

Hence, under the heading of "culture writ large," for example, one should look *inter alia* for those historical, ethnic, religious, normative or linguistic elements that might influence a state's (or leader's, or regime's) orientation towards issues of war and peace. A strong belief in the "democratic peace" or in the promotion of human rights, for example, might predispose state leaders to seek accommodation with like-minded states, and to build security architectures around such shared values.<sup>41</sup> Conversely, a manichean world view could contribute to a strongly antagonist relationship with the rest of the outside world; while a perspective of "hegemonic superiority" could lead either to benign neglect or to aggressive expansionist behaviour. Usually, however, such broad cultural orientations will need to be mediated through other more specific elements of political, diplomatic or strategic culture.

Diplomatic culture is the heading that least taps into domestic "sources," drawing as it does upon shared international or Westphalian norms. Nevertheless, under this heading one can still look for unique or distinctive orientations towards diplomatic practice, such as negotiation strategies, international standing (non-aligned, great power, former colony), or for whether or not a state participates fully in the global diplomatic network or accepts the "rules of the game." Obviously, the policies and interests of states such as Iran, India, Egypt, Canada, or the United States are to some extent shaped in different ways by such subjective factors.

Political cultural elements represent the external projection of domestic political arrangements. Specific domestic political institutions and traditions can facilitate or impede participation in security-building processes. Similarly, societal attitudes toward the use of force and violence, or the historical experience of state-building, can also play a role in influencing a state's stance towards diplomacy (a preference for unilateralism, bilateralism or multilateralism) or its preferences for specific kinds of arms control and confidence and security-building arrangements. For example, one need only note that efforts to control or restrict the flow of light weapons is crucially affected by attitudes towards gun control in the United States. Political cultural elements could also include the external projection of specific socio-cultural patterns of authority, hierarchy and decision-making that are reproduced in a society, such as egalitarian versus hierarchical structures; consensual versus majoritarian decision-making; and clan, caste, or religious authority.

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<sup>41</sup> See, from a voluminous literature, Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Democratic Peace--Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument," *European Journal of International Relations*, 1:4 (1995), 491-517, and the remaining articles in that special issue.