

in "Vienna Document 1992" will provide comprehensive information on military forces, weapons, and budgets which will be invaluable data bases and which can be checked against NIM. Also, information gathered through the proposed scientific exchanges envisioned by the BTWC regime could be correlated with NIM source material.

Table 1 presents in tabular form the conclusions reached in this chapter. It is ordered beginning with NTM/ITM/MTM because these monitoring methods are the foundation for verification decisions in most developed countries today. The chart, however, recognizes the value received when a form of NTM/ITM/MTM is complemented by one or more cooperative or confidence-building measure.

Among Regimes, Agencies, Countries, and Regional Groups

George Lindsey

There are close similarities among verification, monitoring, and intelligence, but they are not the same. Both verification and intelligence rely on monitoring, and verification relies on intelligence. However, the sensitivities over preservation of national security have created major obstacles to acceptance of effective means of verification, and it has proved necessary to design regimes for verification in such a way as to minimize the opportunities which they present for collection of collateral intelligence. The problem is that while the signatories to an arms control agreement are, at least in part, partners

Table 1:
Synergies Among Verification Methods

	NTM/ ITM/MTM	NIM	Data Exchange	Notifi- cations	OSIs	Aerial Inspections	Open Skies	CBMs
NTM/ITM/MTM	—	M	L	L	H	M	M	L
NIM	M	—	L	L	H	M	M	L
Data Exchange	H	H	—	L	H	M	L	L
Notifications	H	M	L	—	H	H	H	M
OSIs	H	H	H	M	—	H	M	M
Aerial Inspections	M	M	L	L	H	—	M	L
Open Skies	M	M	L	L	M	M	—	M
CBMs	L	M	L	L	L	L	M	—

Helps or Impacts Items Listed Horizontally

H = High Value Synergies
M = Medium Value Synergies
L = Low Value Synergies

Helps or Impacts Items Listed Vertically

