

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

pharmaceutical market forces us moreover to admit that highly intrusive arrangements are undesirable and unrealistic. By the same token, however, the scope of the problem cannot serve as a pretext to simply ignore it.

We believe that a differentiated approach based on risk assessment, as proposed by the delegation of the United Kingdom in document CD/514 can be a viable one. In document CD/445, submitted by my delegation some months ago, an attempt was made to demonstrate that such an approach would be manageable from an institutional and organizational point of view. The inspection scheme for high-risk chemicals would have to function on a random basis, using weighing factors depending inter alia on the size of the plant. For medium-risk chemicals, less intrusive verification arrangements, such as surveillance by the Consultative Committee based on data exchange on production statistics, should suffice.

No arrangement or set of arrangements of a routine nature can be considered to provide "adequate" assurance of compliance with the treaty. It is for that reason that we need a challenge inspection mechanism as well. Such a mechanism should serve both as a generally applicable verification device, and as a safety-net to be used in case of lingering doubts, after more routine type verification procedures have been exhausted.

In the view of most delegations the Consultative Committee would play a central role in such a challenge procedure. Challenge requests should not be allowed to be frivolous in nature; they should contain all facts that prompted the request. Unfounded allegations can adversely affect the viability of the Convention. As a general rule, a country ought to accept requests for an on-site inspection resulting from a challenge made. We believe, however, that in exceptional cases a State Party may have legitimate reasons for refusing such a request. In that case it should provide an indication of the nature of those reasons. The question then remains of what step should next be taken if such a refusal only adds to the existing doubts on the Party's compliance.

At this stage I do not wish to enter into the subtleties of arbitration or other procedural mechanisms in situations which, we hope, will prove to be exceptional cases. The procedures to be elaborated should in our view be such that they contribute to a maximum extent to preventing a break-out from the convention. It is the threat of the ultimate break-down of a convention that may provide us with the most forceful incentive for the settlement of such issues.

Mr. President, allow me also to dwell for a short while upon some of the remarks made by the distinguished representative of the USSR in his statement of 24 July. He suggested that the present negotiations are somewhat bogged down on issues, some of them new, of minor detail, perfectly dispensable in a chemical-weapon convention; Ambassador Issraelyan argued that those issues can be adequately catered for by the Consultative Committee once the convention is in force.

My delegation agrees with the underlying assumption in the Soviet statement that certain unresolved issues could be left to the institutions of the convention. However, matters to be dealt with in a chemical-weapons ban are so serious that we cannot be satisfied with the establishment of a sort of "cadre-agreement", leaving major policy issues to the discussion of a future Consultative Committee. Often our present dispute over the very issues mentioned in the Soviet statement is a mere reflection of deeper differences on fundamental questions of substance. We fail to see how the Consultative Committee would be better equipped to solve these problems than we ourselves together with our experts, here and now. I note, in passing,