

In the light of all these politically sensitive problems and their highly unsettling implications, Gorbachev seems to have greatly increased his dependence on the stabilizing capabilities of the Army, KGB and MVD. At the same time, the revolution he is conducting in national security policy requires these institutions to carry out their own far-reaching changes in organization, operational capabilities, responsibilities and doctrine within a prospective framework of greatly reduced budgetary resources, unilateral and internationally agreed arrangements on strategic and conventional military forces, and the unprecedented political innovation of the future accountability of these institutions to the new parliamentary system. In line with this new dispensation, the KGB is now cultivating public respectability at home, and shifting the emphasis of its work to supporting Gorbachev's foreign policy. Its most important domestic task will be the protection of the constitution, and its forces, as well as those of the MVD, will be concerned with nationalities problems and inter-ethnic strife. These tasks, it seems, warrant the full membership of the KGB (through its new Chairman, V. Kryuchkov) in the Politburo.

*Perestroika* evokes among senior professional Army officers strong misgivings and divisions of opinion over the doctrinal revolution and the size and forms of military reductions. There is growing resistance in the General Staff to Army involvement in inter-ethnic strife, growing unrest among junior officers, and growing opposition among Soviet deputies and in public opinion in the Republics, to military conscription and to Russian dominance of the armed forces. Nevertheless, in Generals Moiseyev (CGS) and Yazov (Defence Minister), Shevardnadze (Foreign Minister), and Kryuchkov (KGB), who all owe their promotions to him, Gorbachev has built up a strong national security team. As Chairman of the USSR Defence Council, a position now reserved by a recent constitutional amendment to the President of the Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev is de facto supreme commander of all military, paramilitary and security forces in the country. These various forces would be subordinate in a crisis situation, to the Defence Council. He has, therefore, virtually unlimited responsibility and authority in such a situation and the aggregate effects of all the mechanisms of supreme political power now at his disposal would seem to preclude any possibility of a purely military coup d'état. Thus his effective control of national security policy should not be in doubt so long as progress is being made towards its objectives, and the policy is not seen to be actually jeopardizing the