

"American-bashing." His suspicion - indeed hatred - of the Ottawa mandarins exceeds that of any Albertan. Everything about American politics is at least acceptable (except "McCarthyism," curiously) and everything about the Canadian variety is inferior, if not alarming. At times Barros seems to suggest that the security of Canada, or even the West, is in peril until the awful truth about Pearson and Norman is laid bare. At other times he presents himself as a bold seeker after truth, regardless of the consequences. A clear statement of purpose is obviously in order.

All the commonly heard allegations about Norman's loyalty are found in No Sense of Evil, along with a host of new ones. So a critical review may at least contribute to a fuller treatment of the prevailing doubts and accusations. Some of the Barros footnotes, moreover, led me to interesting sources that I would have otherwise missed. He displayed great energy and imagination, but seven hundred footnotes do not a work of scholarship make. The book is neither history nor political science, nor even good journalism. Rather it is unashamedly a blinkered case for the prosecution.

The preface offers a bizarre Gothic image, but no hint of an objective, or hypothesis to be tested, or even a clearly posed question. The conclusion is anti-climactic. It consists of three tame questions that Barros hopes will be asked by one of "Her Majesty's 282 loyal stalwarts" (217) and the suggestion that, whenever the security police and the mandarins are at odds, "either party could appeal for a review by the Privy Councilors of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, established under the Security Intelligence Service Act ...". (201) Barros' letter to International Perspectives may offer a better clue to his motivation; there he attributes a devastating review by Professor Michael Fry to the fact that "... I have raised doubts about the loyalty of two stalwarts of the Canadian pantheon."

Some passages in No Sense of Evil are factual and fair; most of the book, however, is an unrelenting search for evidence to support a preconceived verdict. Unless the content and footnoting are very deceptive, he has consulted no one who worked with Norman, none of his family, and almost none of his friends (Kiernan is an exception, and perhaps Jaffe). Almost no one was approached who knew him at all well. Barros consulted a few files in Ottawa, and probably members of the security service. He appears to have shunned, however, the rest of the bureaucracy in the belief that it is a cohesive "Old Boys Club" determined to protect any one of its own against all charges and queries. Despite 21 years in Canada, his knowledge of our history and political system is miniscule, and his logic often baffles.