

Line radars would be taken over by the states on whose territories they were situated (Canada, Greenland, and Iceland); Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)-type aircraft would be operated by nonaligned countries such as Sweden and Finland; and the BMEWS stations in Greenland and Britain would be taken over by their respective host countries, while Canada assumed control of the Alaska station. In each case, the information gathered would be made available to anyone who wanted it.

Some signals intelligence stations in Norway, insofar as Wilkes judges them to "serve U.S. strategic offensive purposes (targeting of installations in the Kola Peninsula) as much as Norwegian defensive purposes," would be closed down; but others located in the middle or western parts of the country would be usefully employed in monitoring the GIUK gap. Wilkes acknowledges that determining precisely which of these systems should be retained and which not "may not be easy." He also foresees the likelihood of US resistance to simply handing over some of its most advanced electronic and data processing technology to foreign powers. However, he suggests that "the threat of sudden and forced nationalisation" might be used to convince Washington not to remove its more sophisticated equipment and thereby reduce the effectiveness of the monitoring systems.⁹⁰

Over time, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference has also been quite specific about the scope of the prohibitions that it envisages for an Arctic NWFZ. Thus, the resolution of its 1983 General Assembly called for a ban not only on nuclear testing, "nuclear devices," and "nuclear dump-sites," but also on the "exploration and exploitation of uranium, thorium, lithium, or other materials related to the nuclear industry in our homeland."⁹¹ In stating its opposition to cruise missile testing in northern Canada, the resolution suggested that nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles might also fall within the scope of its prohibitions.

The "Draft Principles on Peaceful and Safe Uses of the Arctic"

90. *Ibid.*, pp. 9 and 11.

91. Resolution 83-01, *op. cit.* note 79.