

trol. The report identified two themes: the defence of Canada, and the building of a global system of common security, although at a later point it notes that "common security has to take precedence over sovereignty."

The report confirmed the NDP decision to withdraw from NATO, but stressed that this would be a gradual process conducted in consultation with the NATO allies. In speaking to the report, party leader Ed Broadbent stated that the NDP would not withdraw during a first term in office, but would use the time to work for changes in NATO policy, such as "no first use" of nuclear weapons and other arms control measures. The NDP proposes to bring back the Canadian forces from West Germany, and possibly undertake a commitment to support Norway as part of a broader approach to Arctic security.

In regard to maritime forces, the party would cancel the nuclear submarine programme, but replace the Oberon-class diesel submarines. In other respects, its

programme for the navy is similar to that of the Conservative government. In terms of air defence, however, the Report states that the NDP would not renew the NORAD agreement in 1991. It would in the meantime develop "some other agreement" with the United States which would dissociate Canada from any involvement in nuclear war-fighting strategies and ballistic missile defence, and increase the capability for peacetime surveillance.

Finally, the report proposes withdrawal from the Defence Production Sharing Agreement with the US and its replacement by the development of a Canadian defence industry capable of building the weapons systems required by the Canadian Armed Forces. The report does not estimate the cost of the programme, or indicate how much the NDP would be willing to spend on defence.

The Liberal Party has not produced as detailed a statement on defence policy, but in a February speech to the party's Vancouver

policy conference in February, leader John Turner re-affirmed party support for Canada's continued participation in both NATO and NORAD. On the other hand, like the NDP the Liberals would cancel the nuclear submarine programme and cruise missile testing. Turner emphasized non-military means as the best way to protect Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.

### Chemical Weapons

■ In early April there were more confirmed reports of the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war. US State Department officials believe that although Iraq was the first to use chemical weapons, Iran has now also used them in retaliation. Large numbers of civilians – possibly between five and ten thousand – appear to have been killed in the Iranian-occupied village of Halabja.

It is estimated that thirty or more countries have stockpiles of chemical weapons, which can be made by any country with a basic chemicals industry and are cheap

to produce. Negotiations continue in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for a convention banning the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

### Soviet Arctic Base

■ A report from Norway in *Jane's Defence Weekly* indicates that a new Soviet naval base for Typhoon and Delta class ballistic missile submarines has been established fifty kilometres from the Norwegian border. The base, on a Kola peninsula fjord at Zapadnaya Litsa, was previously thought to be for Soviet attack submarines. Both Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark and Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty have stressed that if the Soviets are interested in constraints on the militarization of the North, the concentration of force in the Kola peninsula must be included in proposals to limit military deployments. □

- D A V I D C O X

NATO's position on nuclear weapons, and the relationship between conventional and nuclear deterrence.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization superiority in conventional weapons, combined with the Soviet capability for surprise attack, said the communique, "remains at the core of Europe's security concerns." Although the Council regards progress towards a conventional balance as bringing important benefits for stability, it emphasised that deterrence for the foreseeable future would require a mix of conventional and nuclear forces: "...only the nuclear element can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk; therefore for the foreseeable future deterrence will continue to require an adequate mix of nuclear as well as conventional forces... [NATO] will neither make nor accept proposals which would involve an erosion of the Allies' nuclear deterrent capability." The Communique stressed that tanks and artillery were the most threatening weapons in a surprise attack scenario. While indicating that these would be the principal focus of negotiations to reduce asymmetries, the Council also declared its support for initiatives "designed to foster co-operation in the area of conventional armaments, especially research, development, production and procurement."

### Discriminate Deterrence?

■ The theme of improved conventional weapons was central to a report produced by a blue ribbon US defence commission. Chaired by Albert Wohlstetter and former Assistant Secretary of Defence Fred Iklé, the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy was mandated by the Pentagon and presented its final report, entitled *Discriminate Deterrence* to the Secretary of Defense in early January. The Commission took the view that while "apocalyptic" scenarios (including a massive Soviet attack on Western Europe) could not be ruled out, the more probable dangers came from Soviet pressure on the southern and northern flanks of NATO, as well from "out of area" regional conflicts.

Central to its prescriptions was the proposal that over the next decade the Pentagon should give priority to "more mobile and versatile forces," and that NATO should "reassert its technological superiority." In particular, the Commission argued, the strengthening of conventional defence in Europe "should be centered on the vigorous procurement of advanced conventional weapons." Specifically, the report stressed accurate "stand-off" (long-range) weapons using advanced micro-processors, and "low-observable" (invisible to radar, Stealth) systems for aircraft and other vehicles. Such advanced weaponry would allow NATO forces to strike at massed Soviet armoured formations deep behind enemy lines, and the Commission argued, to launch counter-attacks into Warsaw Pact territory.

However, although the Commission stressed the potential transformation of the battlefield through these new technologies, like the NATO Council, it also foresaw the continued need for nuclear deterrence. Unlike NATO nuclear doctrines which seek to emphasize the linkage between nuclear war in Europe and a broader intercontinental nuclear exchange, *Discriminate Deterrence* argues that the Alliance should use nuclear weapons "not as a link to a wider and more devastating war," but discriminately, targeting Soviet command centres and troop concentrations in order to block a Soviet invading force while seeking to prevent the further expansion of the conflict. To date there has been no official reaction to the report, either from Washington or from Brussels.

### New NATO Secretary General

■ On 1 July former West German Defence Minister Manfred Wörner assumes his new duties as NATO Secretary General. Replacing Wörner as the Federal Republic's Defence Minister is Rupert Scholz, currently the head of West Berlin's departments of justice and federal affairs.